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and-usechangesaccountforapproximately20percentof today’stotalgreenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, more than the total transportation sector worldwide. Most
of theseemissionscomefromdeforestationindevelopingcountrieswhereforests
are being cleared for agriculture and timber. Currently, climate change policy-
makers are considering how to create incentives for reducing emissions from de-
forestation and forest degradation in developing countries, or REDD. This report examines the is-
sues facing the incorporation of REDD activities into mainstream market-based climate policies,
paying particular attention to REDD-generated carbon credits that could be traded in the regula-
tory market.
Forests and the Carbon Cycle
Forests play an integral role in mitigating climate change. Not only are forests one of the most
important carbon sinks, storing more carbon than the world’s oil reserves, they also constantly
remove carbon from the atmosphere through photosynthesis, which converts atmospheric car-
bontoorganicmatter.However,whileforestsareabsorbingatmosphericcarbon,deforestationis
putting carbon right back into the atmosphere at an annual rate of 5.9 Gt CO2. In other words,
60 percent of all of the carbon that is absorbed by forests is emitted back into the atmosphere by
deforestation.
Analyses examining the cost of REDD activities predict that abating deforestation is a low-cost
means to achieve emissions reductions. Although the studies vary in their methods and assump-
tions,mostanalysessupporttheideathatsubstantialcarbonbeneﬁtscanberealizedthroughREDD
activities at low initial carbon prices, $3/tCO2 or less. In its conservative calculations, the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that 25 percent of deforestation emis-
sions can be abated for less than $20/tCO2. For comparison, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2008, carbon
was trading at $35/tCO2 in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Given the magnitude of deforestation emissions and predicted low cost to abate, there is gen-
eralagreementthatREDDactivitiesareacost-eﬀectivewayof reducinggreenhousegasemissions,
and thus emissions from deforestation should be addressed immediately (Nabuurs et al. 2007). In
addition to the carbon beneﬁts of REDD activities, abating deforestation can have signiﬁcant sus-
tainable development and environmental co-beneﬁts, including biodiversity conservation, water-
shed protection, protection of ﬁsheries, sustained income for local communities, and reduction
of runoﬀ, siltation, and ﬂooding (Nabuurs et al. 2007).
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EventhoughtheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)speciﬁcally
notes the important role that forests play in the carbon cycle, policy mechanisms to incentivize
forestcarbonactivitieshavebeenlimited.In1997,theKyotoProtocollaidouttargetemissionsre-
ductions and diﬀerent mechanisms by which countries could achieve those targets. One option is
oﬀsets: an Annex 1 (industrialized) country (or a ﬁrm in that country) can pay another country
(or ﬁrm) to reduce emissions and thus oﬀset its own emissions. The Kyoto Protocol established
the rules and ﬁnancing structures for diﬀerent types of oﬀset mechanisms. At that time, the par-
ties to the agreement excluded REDD activities from the oﬀset mechanisms because of uncertain-
ties about the magnitude of deforestation emissions and the ability to monitor deforestation.
As a result, REDD activities cannot be used by countries seeking to meet their obligations un-
der the Kyoto Protocol, and REDD credits have been limited to the voluntary market, where only
a handful of projects are generating credits. These credits are sold at a fraction of the regulatory
marketpricetobuyersseekingtoreducecarbonemissionsforreasonsotherthancompliancewith
their Kyoto obligations; some companies, for example, may perceive market advantages in re-
ducing their carbon footprints and improving their environmental image.
The outlook for REDD changed at the 2005 Conference of the Parties in Montreal. Costa Rica
and Papua New Guinea, on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, proposed to give de-
veloping countries access to the carbon market through credits generated from REDD activities.
This proposal refocused attention on forest carbon and catalyzed the current debate about how
best to achieve sustainable, environmentally robust emissions reductions through forestry.
InDecember2009,thepartieswillmeetinCopenhagentonegotiatenewtargetemissionslev-
els. Further, the parties will decide the mechanisms by which countries can meet those targets,
including whether REDD will be encouraged through market-based incentives or accomplished
through a fund. This report focuses on the policy design issues that must be resolved if credits
from REDD activities will be incentivized by market-based climate policies, such as the incorpora-
tion of REDD credits into the regulatory market.
Policy Design Issues
Any REDD policy must ensure that emissions reductions are real, measurable, and veriﬁable, and
anymarket-basedmechanismsmustensuretheintegrityof boththeemissionsreductionandthe
carbon market. Issues discussed in this section are scope, monitoring, baselines, leakage, stake-
holder interests, permanence, and the potential eﬀect of REDD credits on the carbon market.
Scope
Broadly speaking, all REDD activities can be categorized as projects, policies, or sector activities.
∫ REDDprojectswouldgeneratecreditsbasedonmaintainingcarbonstocksinalocalizedarea.Many
currentREDDprojectsfocusonforestconservationthatcreatesreservesandparkstoprotectthreat-
ened forests. These place-based REDD projects preserve the carbon stocks on land that otherwise
would be deforested.
Executive Summary ∫ REDDpolicieswouldgeneratecreditsbyreformingland-usepoliciestoreducedeforestation.Agri-
cultural subsidies, for example, often create incentives to deforest, and transportation networks
provideaccesstoclearforestsandremovetimber.Policy-basedREDDactivitieswouldreformthese
policies so that they would discourage deforestation.
∫ Sector activities would generate credits by reducing net deforestation rates over an entire coun-
try.Acountryorprovincecouldcommittoatargetemissionscapintheforestrysector.Forsome
developing countries, pursuing emissions targets in the forestry sector might be the most appeal-
ing and powerful way to participate in the global eﬀort to mitigate climate change.
An international REDD policy does not necessarily have to limit itself to a single type of activ-
ity but could allow all three REDD activities, acknowledging that countries diﬀer in the pressures
on their forests and their abilities to manage and monitor the resource.
Relatedisthequestionof whetheraREDDpolicywouldbebuiltaroundnationalcommitments
orproject-basedactivities.Nationalcommitmentsappearbettersuitedtoreachingthegoalof re-
ducing carbon emissions, but because countries diﬀer in their ability to implement REDD activi-
ties, a purely national system might discourage participation by subnational entities that are able
andwillingtoparticipate.Hybridapproachesthatallowsubnationalparticipationcanbedesigned
to be inclusive, accommodating the diﬀerences among countries while also addressing the mag-
nitude of the problem.
Forestsarecomplexecosystemsthatsimultaneouslysequester,store,andemitcarbon.Anum-
brella forest carbon policy that included REDD activities, forest conservation activities, and af-
forestation and reforestation (AR) activities would account for all of the carbon ﬂuxes of forest
ecosystems.However,itiscomplicatedandtimeconsumingtodesignapolicyforjustoneof these
functions. Although ecosystem-based management is ideal, the realities of crafting environmen-
tal policies might impede the creation of ecosystem-based policies.
Monitoring
In recent years, the international climate change community has grown increasingly conﬁdent
aboutmeasuringdeforestationanditsassociatedemissions.Adecadeago,concernsovertheabil-
ity to monitor tropical deforestation and degradation drove some of the original reluctance to
consider REDD as a measurable means of CO2 mitigation. Now, many experts agree that the tech-
nology and methods exist to measure deforestation adequately, predominantly through remote
sensing (DeFries et al. 2005; DeFries et al. 2006; UNFCCC 2006; Mollicone et al. 2007).
Measuring emissions from deforestation involves three steps:
∫ First, a forest inventory assesses the state and extent of a forest.
∫ Second,amonitoringprogrammeasureschangesinthatforest,ideallyusingacombinationof re-
mote sensing and on-the-ground ﬁeld sampling. The complexity of the monitoring program de-
pends on whether the program is measuring just deforestation or includes levels of forest degra-
dation.
∫ Third, data on changes in forest cover are translated into data on forest carbon. Information on
changes in forest cover is not useful unless the carbon content of that forest is also known. This
can be achieved through extensive ﬁeld sampling or, less accurate but more cost-eﬀective, look-
1 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesuptablesthatestimatethecarboncontentfordiﬀerenttypesof forests(Houghton2003a;Achard
et al. 2004; FAO 2006; Mollicone et al. 2007).
Although the methodologies for conducting forest inventories are established, not all coun-
trieshavereliableforestinventories(Step1),andthusforestcarboninventoriesandforestryemis-
sions cannot be calculated.
Baselines
Baselinesaretheyardstickbywhichcountriesmeasurewhethertheyhavereduceddeforestation.
A REDD program must exhibit quantitative reductions of deforestation rates below baseline sce-
narios. Although historical deforestation rates can be established based on existing remote sens-
ing imagery, because of heterogeneity in countries’ recent patterns of deforestation and in the
availability of forest carbon inventories, ﬁnding a single baseline methodology appropriate for all
would-be participants is diﬃcult. Many regions and countries argue that historical rates don’t in-
dicate the current risk of deforestation. For example, some countries experiencing political insta-
bility have a low rate of deforestation because domestic turmoil suppresses access to forests and
markets.Theypredictthatdeforestationpressurewillincreaseif thedomesticsituationstabilizes,
andthusthehistoricalbaselineunderestimatestherealpressure.Countriesthathavealreadytaken
action to prevent deforestation argue that they should be incentivized to keep their deforestation
rates low.
Most of the proposed baselines are thresholds, meaning that deforestation is said to have de-
creased if it drops below a speciﬁc rate, or increased if it goes above. Some argue that this can be
too rigid. Schlamadinger et al. (2005) suggest a target band, or range, that captures a country’s
most likely emissions levels. Within this band, countries would generate discounted credits. The
discount rate applied to the credit would change with proximity to the target bounds. Below the
lower bound, countries could generate full-value credits for incremental emissions reductions.
Theliberallysetupperboundwouldlessentheriskof “runaway”noncompliancebecauseacoun-
try would increasingly beneﬁt from incremental decreases in emissions.
Mollicone et al. (2007) propose a global baseline against which national baselines could be
compared to create incentives for both (a) countries with high deforestation rates to reduce their
rates of forest conversion and (b) countries with low deforestation rates to maintain them. For
countries in category (a), credits are generated based on decreases in national rates of deforesta-
tion;forcountriesincategory(b),creditsarebasedonthediﬀerencebetweentheglobalreference
rate and the national rate.
Leakage
Leakage is a risk for any GHG-mitigating project, whether in the energy sector or in the forestry
sector.Inthecontextof REDD,leakagemeansthatpreventingdeforestationinoneplacemightac-
tually encourage deforestation somewhere else. The agents of deforestation, for example, might
shift their equipment and labor to a nearby patch of unprotected forest. Or REDD activities could
createmarketleakagebyforcingupthemarketpricesof timber,livestock,andcrops,makingde-
forestation somewhere else more proﬁtable. Unless all global forests are included in a REDD pol-
Executive Summary 11icy, leakage cannot be eliminated; however, it can be minimized through careful project design.
Further, leakage can be accounted for by requiring that a percentage of a project’s REDD credits
be held in reserve and not be sold. In this manner, the reserve account would oﬀset or neutralize
the leakage that was assumed to have taken place.
Stakeholder Interests
Designelementssuchasfungibility,liability,andpermanencecaneitherencourageordiscourage
market participation by potential suppliers, buyers, and project developers. Host country suppli-
ers are concerned about maintaining sovereignty over land-use decisions, achieving sustainable




of doing business in the host country, established legal rights for carbon, and the ability to secure
ﬁnancing before the project begins generating credits.
Society as a whole is interested in environmental integrity. Ex post, third-party-veriﬁed REDD
carboncreditsensurethattheenvironmentalintegrityof thesystemismaintained.Front-endde-
sign standards may also contribute to the delivery of high-quality credits.
Permanence and Liability
Whether reduced emissions from deforestation can be considered permanent is part of the cur-
rent debate about REDD. Concerns over permanence are rooted in the idea that emissions reduc-
tions are potentially reversible because of forests’ vulnerability to ﬁres, pest outbreaks, changes
in management, and other natural and anthropogenic disturbances. The concern is that the gain
fromloweremissionsinoneyearmightbeundonebyexceptionallyhighemissions—rateshigher
than they would have been in the business-as-usual (BAU) baseline scenario—in a later year.
In response to concerns over permanence, three types of accounting mechanisms have been
proposed to manage risks of impermanence in REDD credits.
1. Buﬀersandreserveaccountsarearrangementsinwhichapercentageof thecreditsthatcouldbe
generated are held in reserve to counter the risk that deforestation will increase in the future. For
example,if expostveriﬁcationdeterminedthatdeforestationratesbelowthebaselinehadaverted
the emission of 100 tons of carbon, 70 permanent credits could be traded on the carbon market,
and30wouldbedepositedinthereserveaccount.Thepercentageof REDDcreditstobedeposited
into the reserve account or buﬀer would be determined by the risk of the project and the num-
berof yearssincetheproject’sinitiation.ReserveaccountshavebeenemployedbytheVoluntary
Carbon Standard (VCS) to manage risks of impermanence.
2. The ton-year approach is based on the premise that 1 ton of carbon released into the atmos-
phere decays over time until it is absorbed into the ocean or biosphere. The turnover time of car-
bonintheatmosphereessentiallybecomesthedeﬁningfactorindetermining“permanence.”This
istheequivalencyfactorthatrelatesaton-yeartoapermanentreduction.Forexample,if anemis-
sions reduction of 1 ton must persist for 100 years to be permanent, a 1-ton emissions reduction
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Notes:
Series A in Figure i represents the time path to consumption of a fossil fuel stock using traditional incandescent bulbs, which
results in a baseline emissions rate, shown in Figure i.
Series B illustrates a temporary reduction in emissions rates caused by the one-time use of compact fluorescent bulbs, fol-
lowed by replacement with incandescent bulbs and a return to the original emissions rates. Even though the reduction in
emissions rate is temporary, the savings experienced in the initial year are carried through to the end of the time period,
and the atmosphere has less carbon in every time step than it would without the reduction in the initial time period. Thus,
there is a permanent increase in the fossil fuel stocks in every time step and a permanent decrease in the carbon in the at-
mosphere.
Figure i.
Effect of Light Bulb
Use on Fossil Fuel
Stocks
ı ı A: Baseline Stock
(continued use of
incandescent bulb)
ı ı B: Stock with one-
time use of compact
fluorescent
Figure ii.
Effect of Light Bulb
Use on Emissions
Rates
ı ı A: Baseline
Emissions Rate













































in the above scenario, forestry emissions would have to be reduced by 100 tons to generate just
one full-value credit. This would increase the cost of REDD activities by 100.
3. REDD credits could follow the model of the clean development mechanism (CDM), in which
credits generated by AR activities are temporary certiﬁed emissions reductions (tCERs). Forestry
tCERsarevalidforoneﬁve-yearinterval,afterwhichtheyexpire;newtCERsareissueduponrever-
iﬁcation. The buyer would be responsible for ﬁnding a new source of emissions reductions upon
the expiration of the tCERs. Essentially, the buyer has two options: purchase new tCERs that will
expire in ﬁve years, or purchase permanent credits.
If carbonpricesriseatthediscountrate,temporarycreditswillhavenovalue($0).Inthiscase,
a buyer would always choose to purchase a permanent credit instead of a tCER, and there would
be no demand for REDD tCERs at any price.
In the debate over permanence, the underlying question is whether lower emissions rates in
one year are likely to lead to permanently lower levels of carbon in the atmosphere. Permanence
here does not mean that a speciﬁc atom of carbon will remain in a forest or oil reserve forever.
According to IPCC’s Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, “To the extent
that the emission displacement propagates forward until the end of the time horizon, the result
is a ‘permanent’ savings” (Watson et al. 2000, 2.3.6.2). See Figures i and ii, which use the example
of replacing a traditional incandescent bulb with a compact ﬂuorescent just once, and then re-
turning to an incandescent bulb.
All emissions reductions carry some risk of impermanence. For large-scale activities and na-
tionalorsubnationalprograms,theimpermanencerisksof REDDarenotinherentlydiﬀerentfrom
those of avoided fossil fuel emissions, since there will likely be a portfolio of REDD activities si-
multaneously underway. Even if one activity failed, it is improbable that all the REDD activities
would fail simultaneously and cause a spike in deforestation above the baseline. More likely, an
unexpectedly high rate of deforestation in one area would be oﬀset by successful REDD activities
inanother,resultinginnetdecreasesindeforestationemissions.Tocreateaspikeinemissionsand
undo a previous period of low deforestation, routine events occurring under the baseline—burn-
ing,forestconversion—wouldhavetooccuratrateshigherthanthebaselinerate,anditisnotap-
parent why these rates would spike above the baseline rates.
Further, in large-scale REDD activities and national programs, reducing deforestation will re-
quire investments in new governance institutions and forestry management systems, just as re-
ducingfossilfuelemissionsrequirescapitalinvestmentsinnewtechnologiesandinformationdis-
tribution.Oncetheseprocessesareinplace,theremaybesomeinstitutionallock-inorinstitutional
inertia that would also maintain deforestation rates consistently below their baseline and lessen
the probability of future spikes in deforestation. As a result, risks of impermanence in large-scale
REDD programs may be overstated.
Eﬀect on the Carbon Market
REDD credits will probably decrease the overall cost of achieving emissions targets, oﬀering large
quantities of relatively low-cost credits. Although this is generally a good thing, in the absence of
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tation of low-carbon technologies in the energy sector. The displacement of low-carbon tech-
nologies could be ameliorated by tighter emissions targets, limits on the quantity of REDD credits
allowedinthemarket,and/orpriceﬂoors.Thepotentialeﬀectof REDDcreditspredictedbymod-
els will be dampened by delays in host countries’ readiness to implement REDD projects.
Host Country Issues
Althoughthe integrityof REDDcreditschemesdependsontheirdesign(themainfocusof thisre-
port),ultimatelytheirsuccessinachievingglobalemissionstargetsdependsonhost-countries’on-
the-groundabilitytoimplementtheREDDactivities.Readinessvariestremendouslyfromcountry
to country and province to province. For this reason, it is imperative that attention to host coun-
tries’ capacity parallel eﬀorts on the international design issues. A handful of new initiatives, in-
cludingtheWorldBank’sForestCarbonPartnershipFacilityandtheBrazilianAmazonFund,have
been launched to improve readiness among key developing countries.
Further, communities in forested regions in developing countries are some of the most im-
portantstakeholdersbecauseREDDpolicieswillaﬀecttheirlivelihoods,andthesestakeholderswill
likely be directly involved in the implementation and maintenance of REDD activities. Without
theirparticipation,achievementof theenvironmentalandsustainabledevelopmentgoalstargeted
by REDD activities will be impossible. Eﬀorts to link forest communities with REDD negotiations
and planning at the international level will improve the chances for success.
The challenges facing the incorporation of REDD into mainstream climate change policies are
not trivial. However, the potential rewards from getting it right stretch beyond the emissions re-
ductions themselves and include the sustainable development of forest-dependent communities
andtheconservationof someof theworld’srichestforestecosystems.Thisreportexploresissues
that must be systematically addressed if an economically and environmentally sound REDD cred-
iting scheme is to be developed.
ı ı ı
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Introduction
A
nnually, land-use changes account for approximately 20 percent of total green-
house gas (GHG) emissions, more than the total transportation sector world-
wide.Mostof theseemissionscomefromdeforestationindevelopingcountries
where forests are being cleared for agriculture and timber. Currently, climate
change policymakers are considering how to create incentives for reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, or REDD.
In this report, I examine the speciﬁc issues facing the incorporation of REDD activities into
mainstream market-based climate policies, paying particular attention to REDD-generated carbon
credits that could be traded in the regulatory market. I focus mainly on credit design and buyer
country issues. These issues must be resolved to implement a REDD policy that would be envi-
ronmentallyrobust,encourageparticipationbyprojectdevelopersandcreditbuyers,andprovide
aneconomicallyattractiveoptionfordevelopingnationsconsideringhowbesttousetheirforests.
Chapter 2 provides background information on what role forests play in the carbon cycle and
how climate change policies have until now dealt with emissions from deforestation. Although
tropical deforestation is a longstanding environmental issue, the climate debate has focused new
attention on the services rendered by tropical forests. As a result, the science surrounding defor-
estation has improved in recent years. The chapter provides an overview of the scientiﬁc litera-
ture on the magnitude of deforestation and the cost of REDD activities.
InternationalclimatechangepolicieshavenotyetcreatedincentivesforREDDactivities,partly
becauseof uncertaintiesinearlierscientiﬁcstudiesaboutemissionsfromdeforestation.Currently,
no mechanism within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
orKyotoProtocolallowsREDDactivitiestofunctionasameanstoachieveemissionstargets.Chap-
ter 2 oﬀers a brief history of how international climate change policies have handled emissions
from deforestation. In addition, the voluntary market for REDD credits and the consideration of
REDD activities in U.S. climate change bills are discussed.
Deforestation and forest degradation are clearly a large source of global GHG emissions,
prompting proposals to create incentives for REDD activities through mainstream market-based
climatepolicies.Chapter3examinestheissuesthatmustbeaddressedtodeterminewhetherand
how REDD could be incorporated into market-based mechanisms, such as the carbon market.
Thoseissuearescope,monitoring,baselines,leakage,stakeholderinterests,permanence,andthe
potential eﬀect of REDD credits on the carbon market. Of course, the design of a REDD policy in-
tertwines all these issues. I make an eﬀort to analyze each individually, and I note where the sig-
niﬁcant interconnections lie and how decisions on one issue might resolve or further complicate
1 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesother issues. For example, whether REDD policies are based on national participation or project-
level participation will signiﬁcantly aﬀects the risks of leakage and impermanence.
My discussion of the speciﬁc issues draws upon existing literature and is intended to be a syn-
thesis of the current debate. The one exception is my discussion of permanence. If REDD policies
are based on national participation, then impermanence risks for REDD are not inherently diﬀer-
entfromthoseof fossilfuelemissionsreductions.Permanencerisksassociatedwithforestcarbon
can be managed such that a reduction in forestry emissions is no diﬀerent from a reduction in
otheremissions.Ishowhowreductionsindeforestationwouldbepermanentaslongasthebase-
line deforestation rate is not exceeded. Also in the subsection on permanence, I show how tem-
porary REDD credits would have $0 value in a possible market scenario.
After examining the major issues facing the incorporation of REDD into market-based climate
policies, I compare ﬁve proposed REDD policies, highlighting how they address issues diﬀerently.
AstheREDDdebatemovesforwardintheinternationalclimatechangecommunityandamong
buyer countries, it will be paramount to examine the diﬀerent circumstances facing individual
host countries to determine whether and how REDD activities could align with existing land-use
goals. In Chapter 4, I summarize the most pressing host country issues. However, individual host




Forests and the Carbon Cycle
F
orests play an integral role in mitigating climate change. Not only are forests one
of the most important carbon sinks, storing more carbon than the world’s oil re-
serves, they also constantly remove carbon from the atmosphere through photo-
synthesis, which converts atmospheric carbon to organic matter. Covering more
than 30 percent of the global land area in 2005, the UN Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (FAO) estimates that global forests store 638 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon (C) in their
ecosystems, compared with approximately 750 GtC stored in the atmosphere. Of this forest car-
bon, 283 Gt (44 percent) is stored in forest biomass, and the remainder is stored in soil (46 per-
cent), dead wood (6 percent), and forest litter (4 percent) (FAO 2006).
Whileforestsareconstantlyremovingcarbonfromtheatmosphere,deforestationispumping
carbon right back into it. For many of us familiar with temperate forests that are stable or in-
creasing in size, it is hard to imagine the magnitude of deforestation in the tropics. Carbon-rich
tropical forests are shrinking at a relatively rapid rate and emitting carbon once stored within the
organic matter. Annually, deforestation removes 13 million hectares (ha) of forest, or 0.2 percent
of total forest area (FAO 2006). In the tropics, the annual deforestation rate is approximately 0.6
percent, three times higher than the global rate. In the period 1990–2005, 8.3 percent of tropical
forest area was lost (FAO 2006; Butler 2007).
Carbon Emissions from Deforestation
Deforestation in developing countries is frequently driven by agriculture, logging, and road ex-
pansion.Risingpricesforsoy,palmoil,andbeef makeitincreasinglycost-eﬀectivefordeveloping
countries to clear their forests and convert the land to agriculture. Often, burning is the cheapest
and easiest way to clear the land. When forests are logged, only a fraction of the wood becomes
dimensional lumber for eventual use in housing and other structures. The majority of the forest
vegetation ends up as waste, and thus the majority of the carbon from the forest ends up in the
atmosphere.Further,policiesthatexpandroadinfrastructureprovideaccessforloggers,farmers,
and homesteaders to the previously inaccessible forest interior.
Deforestation and land-use activities including burning, decomposiiton of waste forest matt-
ter, soil degradation in cleared lands, and other land-use activities, emit approximately 1.6 GtC,
1 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesor5.9Gtcarbondioxide(CO2)(IPCC2007),accountingforroughly20percentof globalCO2emis-
sions. For comparison, annual emissions from burning fossil fuel and making cement are ap-
proximately6.4GtC(IPCC2007).Of course,forestsaresimultaneouslyabsorbingcarbonthrough
photosynthesis, countering the eﬀect of carbon emissions from deforestation. Forests and other
terrestrial sinks annually absorb approximately 2.6 GtC. As a result, net carbon absorption rates
by forests globally are approximately 1.0 GtC annually (IPCC 2007).
Figure 2.1 shows the individual emissions and absorptions from speciﬁc forestry activities
(Baumert et al. 2005). Note the signiﬁcantly greater eﬀect of deforestation than aﬀorestation and
reforestation(AR)activities.Figure2.1doesnotincludetheabsorptionof carbonbyforestsnotin-
ﬂuenced by land-use activities, which may be large (Sierra et al. 2007).
Deforestation and land-use activities account for approximately 20 percent of global anthro-
pogenicCO2emissions(IPCC2000;WRI/CAIT2008),accountingformoreCO2emissionsthanthe
transportationsector(Figure2.2).However,theexactmagnitudeof land-usechangeemissionsis
uncertain because of (a) uncertainty in the estimates of deforestation rates in some regions, and
(b)uncertaintyinthecarbonstoragecapacityof diﬀerentforests.Bestestimatesof emissionsfrom
deforestation in the tropics in the 1990s range from 0.9 GtC/year(Achard et al. 2004) to 2.2
GtC/year (Houghton 2003a). See Table 2.1 for more information on deforestation estimates.
IntheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC2007)lowestimate,land-usechange
and forestry (LUCF) emissions still account for 7.5 percent (0.5 GtC/year) of anthropogenic car-
bon emissions. Even the low estimate shows that LUCF emissions are greater than the estimated
carbon sequestration by AR projects (Denman et al. 2007). In the IPCC’s (2007) high estimate, LUCF
emissions account for 30.4 percent (2.7 GtC/year) of carbon emissions (Denman et al. 2007). Al-
thoughLUCFemissionshavehighuncertainty,themagnitudeof theseemissions—evenunderlow








Notes: The magnitude of
CO2 emissions from defor-
estation is significantly








BILLIONS OF TONS OF CO2










Net TotalLUCF emissions are not evenly distributed around the globe but concentrated in a few tropical
countries experiencing very high rates of deforestation. Brazil and Indonesia account for approx-
imately 50 percent of net deforestation (FAO 2006). The 15 countries with the highest LUCF CO2
emissions, according to World Resources Institute’s CAIT database (WRI/CAIT 2008), are shown in
Table 2.2. These countries account for almost 90 percent of net global LUCF CO2 emissions
(Houghton 2003b; WRI/CAIT 2008). With the exception of Mexico, LUCF emissions make up the
majorityof thesecountries’GHGemissions.Further,for10of thetop15countries,LUCFemissions
account for more than 80 percent of their total CO2 emissions.2
Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of LUCF emissions for the top CO2 emitters according to the
WRI/CAITdatabase.LUCFemissionsaccountforamajorportionof totalemissionsforsomeof the
top CO2-emitting countries. Indonesia, Brazil, and Malaysia are among the top 10 GHG emitters





Notes: According to the
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Electricity and heat 11,581.5 34.5
Transportation 5,089.0 15.2
Manufacturing and construction 4,748.4 14.2
Other fuel combustion 3,488.1 10.4
Fugitive emissions 190.6 0.6
SubTotal 25,097.6 74.8
Industrial processes 828.1 2.5
Land-use change and forestry 7,618.6 22.7
Total 33,544.3
Table 2.1 Estimates of Land-to-Atmosphere Emissions Resulting from Land-Use Changes during 1990s
TROPICAL TROPICAL TROPICAL TOTAL
AMERICAS AFRICA ASIA PAN-TROPICAL NONTROPICS GLOBAL
Houghton 0.8 ± 0.3 0.4 ± 0.2 1.1 ± 0.5 2.2 ± 0.6 –0.02 ± 0.5 2.2 ± 0.8
(2003a) {2.9 ± 1.1} {1.5 ± 0.7} {4.0 ± 1.8} {8.1 ± 2.2} {–0.07 ± 1.8} {8.1 ± 2.9}
DeFries et al. 0.5 0.1 0.4 1.0 n.a. n.a.
(2002) (0.2 to 0.7) (0.1 to 0.2) (0.2 to 0.6) (0.5 to 1.6)
{1.8; 0.7 to 2.6} {0.4; 0.4 to 0.7} {1.5; 0.7 to 2.2} {3.7; 1.8 to 5.9}
Achard et al. 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.9 n.a. n.a.
(2004) (0.3 to 0.4) (0.1 to 0.2) (0.3 to 0.5) (0.5 to 1.4)
{1.1; 1.1 to 1.5} {0.7; 0.4 to 0.7} {1.5; 1.1 to 1.8} {3.3; 1.8 to 5.1}
IPCC AR4 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.6 –0.02 1.6
best estimate (0.4 to 0.9) (0.2 to 0.4) (0.4 to 1.1) (1.0 to 2.2) (–0.5 to +0.5) (0.5 to 2.7)
(2007) {2.6; 1.5 to 3.3} {1.1; 0.7 to 1.5} {2.9; 1.5 to 4.0} {5.9; 3.7 to 8.1} {–0.07; –1.8 to 1.8} {5.9; 1.8 to 9.9}
Notes: Fluxes in GtC/year; {Fluxes in Gt CO2/year in brackets}. Uncertainties are reported as ± 1 standard deviation. Numbers in parentheses are ranges of
uncertainties.
Achard et al. (2004) and DeFries et al. (2002) rely heavily on remote sensing methodologies, which yield much more conservative estimates than
Houghton’s (2003a) bookkeeping methodology,which incorporates past calculations of sources and sinks with changes in forest area and forest biomass
reported by the FAO Forest Resources Assessment 2000 (DeFries et al. 2002; Houghton 2003a; Achard et al. 2004; FAO 2006). The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change made a best estimate of global land-use change emissions of 1.6 GtC/year calculated from the mean of the DeFries et al. (2002) and
Houghton (2003) studies (IPCC 2007).





Table 2.2 CO2 Emissions for Top 15 LUCF CO2 Emitting Countries
LUCF EMISSIONS
AS A PERCENTAGE
MTCO2 FROM PERCENT OF WORLD TONS LUCF MTCO2 FROM PERCENT OF OF DOMESTIC
COUNTRY LUCF RANK LUCF TOTAL CO2/ PERSON ALL SOURCES RANK WORLD TOTAL EMISSIONS
Indonesia 2,563.10 (1) 33.64 12.4 2,859.10 (3) 9.01 89.65
Brazil 1,372.10 (2) 18.01 7.9 1,708.80 (4) 5.39 80.30
Malaysia 698.90 (3) 9.17 30.4 820.80 (9) 2.59 85.15
Myanmar 425.40 (4) 5.58 8.9 434.80 (15) 1.37 97.84
Congo, Dem. Rep. 317.30 (5) 4.16 6.3 318.90 (20) 1.01 99.50
Zambia 235.50 (6) 3.09 22.0 237.40 (28) 0.75 99.20
Nigeria 194.80 (7) 2.56 1.7 273.80 (26) 0.86 71.15
Peru 187.20 (8) 2.46 7.2 215.40 (31) 0.68 86.91
Papua New Guinea 146.00 (9) 1.92 27.6 148.40 (36) 0.47 98.38
Venezuela 144.10 (10) 1.89 5.9 283.30 (25) 0.89 50.86
Nepal 123.50 (11) 1.62 5.1 126.70 (40) 0.40 97.47
Colombia 106.10 (12) 1.39 2.5 169.50 (35) 0.53 62.60
Mexico 96.80 (13) 1.27 1.0 481.70 (12) 1.52 20.10
Philippines 94.90 (14) 1.25 1.3 170.20 (34) 0.54 55.76
Côte d’Ivoire 91.10 (15) 1.20 5.4 98.00 (44) 0.31 92.96
World total 7,618.6 100.00 33,544.30 100.00 22.70
Note: This table only considers CO2 emissions and does not include emissions of other GHG.
Source: CAIT database (WRI 2008).
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Source: WRI/CAIT 2008.Deforestation versus Degradation
As the name REDD implies, deforestation and degradation are distinct activities. Although often
lumped together, they have unique drivers and result in diﬀerent forest conditions, and the
processesof identifyingandabatingdeforestationanddegradationcanbequitediﬀerent.Forthese
reasons, it is important to understand the diﬀerences.
Deforestation is deﬁned by IPCC as the “permanent removal of forest cover and withdrawal of
land from forest use, whether deliberately or circumstantially” (Watson et al. 2000). Forestconver-
sion to pasture, cropland, or other managed uses is considered the same as deforestation unless
noted otherwise. UNFCCC and IPCC employ a minimum crown cover criterion of 10 to 30 percent4
to diﬀerentiate between forests and nonforests. If crown cover is reduced below this threshold,
deforestation has occurred.
Deforestation is often driven by government-supported agricultural and timber policies, in-
ternational markets for agricultural and forest products, population growth, and expansion of
roadnetworks.Itisconductedbyentitieswithsuﬃcientcapitaltoclearforests.Saidanotherway,
it generally takes money to pay for the equipment and labor necessary to clear forests. Whereas
deforestation eliminates the forest canopy, degradation includes all actions resulting in carbon
emissions that do not involve elimination of the canopy. Degradation can result from selective
logging, grazing within forests, and understory ﬁres as well as overcutting for fuelwood and sub-
sistence agriculture. Degradation causes the gradual thinning of forests and can lead to defor-
estation, as seen in studies from the Brazilian Amazon (Asner et al. 2006). In the vicinity of roads
andsettlements,degradationmaybeatleastaswidespreadasdeforestation(Trinesetal.2006;As-
ner et al. 2007).
The potential carbon beneﬁts of abating forest degradation are great; however, degradation
is more diﬃcult to identify and monitor than deforestation because of the sophisticated remote
sensing program and ground-truthing required. Further, carbon ﬂuxes associated with forest
degradation are more uncertain. These challenges have created some concern about the practi-
calityof includingdegradationinapolicytoabateforestryemissions.Althoughthisreportrefers
to REDD policies, which implies the inclusion of forest degradation, the discussions and analyses
are equally relevant to RED (reduced emissions from deforestation) policies.
Costs of REDD Activities
Earlyeﬀortstoexaminethecostsandbeneﬁtsof forestcarbonfocusedoncarbonsequestrationin
the forestry sector through activities such as AR, forest management, manipulation of rotation
lengths, and the like (Sedjo and Solomon 1989; Richards and Stokes 2004). In some early studies




diﬀerent carbon prices, one cannot tease out the speciﬁc contributions of REDD activities.
Recently, more analyses have focused speciﬁcally on the carbon beneﬁts and costs of REDD ac-
tivities (Osafo 2005; Osborne and Kiker 2005; Sathaye et al. 2005; Silva-Chavez 2005; Greig-Gran
2006; Kindermann et al. 2006; Sohngen and Beach 2006; Nepstad et al. 2007; Anger and Sathaye
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1. Some studies focus on
cumulative carbon bene-
ﬁts over a time period,
whereas others focus on
annual carbon beneﬁts.
2. BAU is business-as-usual.2008;Strassburgetal.2008).Thestudiesusediﬀerentmethodologiesandunderlyingassumptions,
making direct comparison diﬃcult. Some studies focus on the one-time beneﬁts of a speciﬁc
forestry project (Osborne and Kiker 2005). Other studies use models based on local opportunity
costsaggregatedtoanationalormultinationallevel(Greig-Gran2006,Nepstadetal.2007;Strass-
burgetal.2008).OtherstudiesuseglobalmodelsthatconstructREDDcarbonsupplycurvesatdif-
ferent carbon prices (Sohngen and Beach 2006; Anger and Sathaye 2008; Sathaye et al. 2005; Kin-
dermanetal.2006).Theresultsof thesestudiesaresummarizedinTable2.3.Althoughtheresults
vary, all but one study support the conclusion that substantial carbon beneﬁts can be realized
through REDD activities at low initial carbon prices ($10/tC or less); the exception is the McKinsey
report by Enkvist et al. (2007).
TheMcKinseyreportfoundthatreducingdeforestationby50percentinAfricaand75percent
in Latin America could be achieved for about $183.50/tC ($50/tCO2) and abate 3 GtCO2 emis-
sions(Enkvistetal.2007).Enkvistetal.(2007)foundthatabatingdeforestationratesinAsiawould
be more expensive because of higher opportunity costs for forests. Additionally, they found that
avoiding deforestation was more expensive than other forest mitigation measures.
Osafo(2005),OsborneandKiker(2005),andSilva-Chavez(2005)calculatethebreak-evenprice
forcarbonbasedontheopportunitycostof forestedlandintheregionsstudied.Greig-Gran(2006)
calculates the discounted return per hectare and not the price of land, explaining that land prices
do not reﬂect avoided deforestation costs because of land tenure issues surrounding tropical
forests.Thesestudiesdrawoninformationaboutcurrentdriversof deforestation,suchastheper-
centage of land cleared for soy farming, cattle ranching, timber harvest, and the like to calculate
theopportunitycost.Osafo(2005)accountsforrevenuesfromagriculturebutnottheproduction
costs and thus may overestimate the opportunity cost (Greig-Gran 2006). Greig-Gran (2006) in-
cludes transaction costs estimated from the administrative costs of payment-for-ecosystem-ser-
vices (PES) programs in place in other countries. Speciﬁcally, Greig-Gran (2006) uses
$4–$15/ha/yearbasedonPESprogramsinplaceinCostaRica,Mexico,andEcuador.Itisnotclear
how appropriate it is to extrapolate worldwide transaction costs based on these estimates. Greig-
Gran (2006) does not include monitoring costs in her calculations. However, she estimates that
monitoring costs would add $2 million/year for each of the eight countries studied. None of the
otherstudiesexplicitlyaccountforadministrativeandtransactioncosts.OsborneandKiker(2005)
notethatcostsforREDDpilotprojectsrangefrom$0.10to$15pertoncarbonworldwideand$1to
$6 per ton carbon in Latin America, though they do not include this in their cost calculations.
Sathaye et al. (2005) use a dynamic partial equilibrium model to examine the response of the
forestry sector to carbon prices. Kindermann et al. (2006) use a spatially explicit integrated bio-
physicalandsocioeconomicland-usemodel.SohngenandBeach(2006)useaglobaltimbermodel
to calculate the carbon supply curves for REDD activities at diﬀerent carbon prices. Sohngen and
Beach’s (2006) results are broken out by region, as shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
Inregionswhereforestsarerelativelyabundant,carbonstocksarehigh,anddeforestationrates
are high, avoiding deforestation may oﬀer the highest potential for CO2 mitigation (Trines et al.
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price scenarios. They considered long-rotation forestry, short-rotation forestry, and reduced de-
forestation. Their modeling found that reduced deforestation would account for 51 to 78 percent
of carbonbeneﬁtsgainedby2100,dependingontheinitialcarbonpriceandrateof priceincrease.
Althoughthescenariothatbeganat$75/tC($20.5/tCO2)yieldedthegreatestcarbonbeneﬁts,half
of the reduced deforestation beneﬁts could be gained at carbon prices starting at $5 to $10/tC
($1.37 to $2.73/tCO2).
Given the magnitude of deforestation emissions and the predicted low abatement costs com-
pared with both forestry and other mitigation measures, there is general agreement that emis-
sions from deforestation and degradation should be addressed immediately (Nabuurs et al. 2007;
Stern2007).Afteranextensiveanalysisof theeconomicsof climatechange,theSternReviewcon-
cludedthat“curbingdeforestationisahighlycost-eﬀectivewayof reducinggreenhousegasemis-
sions and has the potential to oﬀer signiﬁcant reductions fairly quickly” (Stern 2007, 537).
In the context of forestry and land-use measures, both the Stern Review and the IPCC Work-
ing Group on Climate Change Mitigation (IPPC 2007) independently concluded that carbon mit-
igationeﬀortsaimedatreducingdeforestationratesoﬀerthegreatestbeneﬁtsbecauseof thesize
of the source and the cost-eﬀectiveness of reducing emissions (Nabuurs et al. 2007; Stern 2007).
Inananalysisof theroleof theforestrysectorinmitigatingclimatechange,IPCC(2007)concluded,
“Reduced deforestation and degradation is the forest mitigation option with the largest and most
immediate carbon stock impact in the short term per ha and per year globally … because large
carbonstocks(about350–900tCO2/ha)arenotemittedwhendeforestationisprevented”(Nabu-
urs et al. 2007, 14).
Inadditiontothecarbonbeneﬁtsof REDDactivities,abatingdeforestationcanhavesigniﬁcant
environmental and sustainable development co-beneﬁts including biodiversity conservation; wa-
tershed protection; reduction of runoﬀ, siltation, and ﬂooding; protection of ﬁsheries; and sus-
tained incomes for local communities (Nabuurs et al. 2007). Despite agreement about the bene-
ﬁtsof REDDactivities,signiﬁcantdisagreementexistsoverhowbesttoachievethemandwhatrole
market mechanisms should play in incentivizing REDD.
Deforestation and International Climate Policies
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change laid out tar-
get emissions reductions and the diﬀerent mechanisms by which countries could achieve those
targets.Toachievethetargets,countrieshadtwooptions:eitherreducetheirowndomesticemis-
sions, or pay someone else to reduce their emissions and thus oﬀset the country’s domestic emis-
sions with reductions somewhere else.
TheKyotoProtocolestablishedtherulesandﬁnancingstructuressurroundingdiﬀerenttypes
of oﬀset mechanisms. At that time, the Parties to the Protocol excluded REDD from the oﬀset
mechanismbecauseof uncertaintiesaboutthemagnitudeof deforestationemissionsandtheabil-
ity to monitor deforestation.
Although UNFCCC speciﬁcally notes the important role that forest sinks play in the sequestra-
tion of carbon, policy mechanisms to incentivize terrestrial carbon sequestering have been lim-
ited.TheKyotoProtocoldoesrecognizecreditsfromARactivities,whichcanbeusedtogenerate
oﬀsets under its clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI) mechanism.
2 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesAR credits are capped for use by Annex I parties (the industrialized nations) at 1 percent of base-
yearemissionsor5percentof emissionsduringtheentireﬁve-yearcommitmentperiodfrom2008
to 2012 (Schlamadinger et al. 2005). At this time, avoided deforestation activities are excluded as




reasons other than compliance with the law, such as improving their environmental image.
The outlook for REDD changed at the 2005 Conference of the Parties in Montreal. Costa Rica
and Papua New Guinea, on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, proposed to give de-
velopingcountriesaccesstothecarbonmarketthroughcreditsgeneratedfromREDDactivities.In
response,UNFCCClaunchedatwo-yearinitiativetoexaminethepotentialof REDD.Thosetwoyears
culminated at the 13th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (CoP 13) in Bali, in December 2007.
Oﬃcially,theBalidecisionwasquitemodest.TheBaliActionPlanformallylistedREDDamong
other mitigation activities as a potential means to achieve emissions targets and encouraged vol-
untary action on REDD. The decision of whether and how REDD would ﬁt into the international
climate mitigation strategy was put oﬀ until CoP 15 in Copenhagen, in 2009.
And yet, Bali was a turning point because it put REDD on the broader CoP agenda, signaling
that the international climate change framework will address the problem of emissions from de-
forestationinsomemanner.TheBalidecisionencouragescapacitybuildingandthedevelopment
of pilotprojects.Byreducingsomeof theuncertaintyaboutthefutureof REDD,theBalidecision
encourages developing countries and project developers to begin investing in REDD activities. Al-
though the Bali decision put REDD on the roadmap, it did not include any language about the ﬁ-
nancing mechanism that might be used. Currently, several market-based and nonmarket-based
initiatives are underway.
Nonmarket-based initiatives include Brazil’s Amazon Fund, launched in August 2008 to sup-
port sustainable development and conservation in the region. Norway pledged $1 billion by 2015
to the fund and will begin payment immediately, but full payment is contingent upon a demon-
strated reduction in deforestation (Mongabay.com 2008). The Amazon Fund follows the model
of Brazil’s proposed Voluntary RED Fund, which would reward countries that successfully re-
duced emissions from deforestation below reference rates. The fund would be supported by con-
tributions from developed countries. Other nonmarket-based initiatives include increasing devel-
opmentassistance,bartertransactionssuchasdebtcancellation,taxingcarbon-intensiveactivities
to fund REDD activities, and cultivating private sponsorship.
Market-based REDD initiatives that build on the existing voluntary carbon market have gained
a lot of support and are further discussed below. Some propose that REDD credits could be traded
with other carbon credits without restriction. Others favor creating a separate market for REDD
credits, distinct from the existing compliance market. Still others favor a combination of the two
approaches.
Background 2The Current Market for Forestry Credits
Because REDD is excluded from the ﬁnancing mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, demand for de-
forestation credits is relatively low and composed entirely of voluntary eﬀorts. Demand for cred-
its from AR activities is also low because the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS),
the largest such scheme in the world, currently excludes forestry credits, including those from AR
activities. This is not to say that demand is nonexistent—in fact, forestry projects accounted for
15 percent of the voluntary carbon market in 2007 (Hamilton et al. 2008). However, this is still
less than 0.2 percent of the $64 billion worldwide market for carbon-denominated assets.
Among voluntary programs, the World Bank dominates the current forestry credit market
with its BioCarbon fund portfolio, which is expected to produce 6 million carbon credits. Taking
into account the 5 percent cap on forestry CDM credits, Neef and Henders (2007) estimate the po-
tential market volume to be 75 million carbon credits, much higher than the current market size.
With the encouragement of the Group of Eight, the World Bank announced a new, $250 mil-
lion Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in Bali on December 11, 2007 (G8 2007). The FCPF
is two funds within one facility with the dual objective of (a) building capacity for REDD in devel-
oping countries and (b) testing a program of performance-based payments in pilot countries to
laythefoundationforalargersystemof positiveincentivesandﬁnancingﬂowsinthefuture.The
general goal is to catalyze institutions and capacity-building for REDD such that the market will
eventually take over much of the funding activities. Because REDD activities are outside the CDM
protocol, credits generated by FCPF projects cannot be used for compliance as long as REDD activ-
ities are excluded from the regulatory market. In the meantime, REDD credits are expected to be
traded on the voluntary market. The FCPF focuses on national-level participation and requires a
country to make a nationwide commitment to reduce its deforestation rate. It will not support
project-level activities without a national commitment to reduce deforestation.
In July 2008, the World Bank announced the ﬁrst recipients of the readiness fund of the FCPF.
Thefundingwillsupportworktoestablishbaselineemissionsreferencelevels,adoptstrategiesto
reduce deforestation, and design methodologies for monitoring progress. The selected 14 coun-
tries are in Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Madagas-
car), Latin America (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Mexico, and Panama), and Asia (Nepal, Lao
PDR, and Vietnam).
In addition to the World Bank’s eﬀorts are a handful of planned and existing REDD projects,
ranging from discrete forest conservation projects to provincial-level REDD commitments that in-
volveaportfolioof sustainableforestmanagement,forestconservation,andotheractivities.Cred-
itsfromtheseprojectsaresoldonthevoluntarymarketandcannotbeusedbyentitiesseekingto
meet compliance obligations. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these subnational projects is the
UluMasenproject,whichincorporatestheentireprovinceof Aceh,Indonesia.InFebruary2008,
the project design was approved by the CCB Standards, a rigorous design standard that requires
land-based carbon projects to simultaneously generate climate, biodiversity, and sustainable de-
velopment beneﬁts. The Ulu Masen project is projected to reduce emissions by 100 million tons
over 30 years, equivalent to Mexico’s annual emissions (Efstathiou 2008). Given its size and com-
plexity, the Ulu Masen project is breaking new ground for REDD activities. It is expected to begin
generating credits for sale on the voluntary market in late 2008.
2 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesREDD and the Future Carbon Market
Uncertainties regarding the magnitude of LUCF emissions and concerns over sovereignty4 and
methodological issues, such as leakage, additionality, and permanence, were at the source of the
original reluctance to consider REDD activities as a means to generate carbon credits (Gullison et
al. 2007). Some of these concerns have been assuaged. Further, consensus is growing that the
globalcommunityisnotgoingtosolvetheclimatechangeproblemwithoutaddressingemissions
from forests, and conﬁdence in monitoring methodologies for LUCF emissions is increasing. For
many developing countries endowed with large tropical forests, the carbon market oﬀers signiﬁ-
cant funding to support forest protection and sustainable development programs; thus, they are
willing to consider engaging in the climate dialogue and taking on emissions reduction commit-
ments, at least in the forestry sector.
Arguments for Incorporating REDD into the Carbon Market
Generally, arguments in favor of incorporating REDD into the carbon market are based on the
amount of funding available and the potential to engage developing countries in climate change
mitigation. Additional arguments include the following:
∫ LUCF emissions account for 20 percent of annual CO2 emissions, which can be addressed, at least
in part, through the carbon market.
∫ REDD is a cost-eﬀective means to achieve emissions goals.
∫ Forestry projects can align with ecological and sustainable development goals.
∫ CreditsgeneratedfromREDDcreateameansfordevelopingcountriestoparticipateincarbonmar-
kets.
∫ Historically, oﬃcial development assistance and nonmarket-based ﬁnancing projects targeting
tropical deforestation have suﬀered from limited funds and interest.5
Arguments against Incorporating REDD into the Carbon Market
Generally, the counterarguments fall into two categories: principled arguments against inclusion
of REDD activities into mainstream market mechanisms, and practical concerns over the design
and consequences of REDD credits. In summary, the principled arguments are as follows:
∫ REDD would distract attention from the problem of fossil-based energy production.
∫ It would reduce pressure on Annex I countries to increase their targets and implement in-coun-
try carbon mitigation programs.
∫ It may have adverse eﬀects on sustainable development goals and local communities.
∫ It would provide incentives only for countries with high rates of deforestation and fails both to
reward countries that have already reduced deforestation and to create incentives for countries
that have never had high rates of deforestation (such as Democratic Republic of Congo).
The issues surrounding the design of REDD mechanisms at both the international and the na-
tional level are explored in detail in Chapter 3.
Background 2REDD and U.S. Domestic Climate Change Policy
International forestry projects and REDD-generated oﬀsets provide a potentially cost-eﬀective
meansforentitiestomeettheiremissionsobligations.Infact,onemodelingstudyfoundthatfor-
estcarbon(mostlyfromREDD)couldcuttheglobalcostof climatechangepoliciesinhalf (Tavoni
et al. 2007). For the United States, this means that REDD-generated oﬀsets could play a signiﬁcant
role in reducing the costs of any proposed market-based climate change policy. Further, invest-
mentsinREDDcreditsmayhavesustainabledevelopmentandenvironmentalco-beneﬁtsthatalign
with U.S. goals for development aid.
BecausetheUnitedStatesiscurrentlynotapartytotheKyotoProtocol,Congresswillnotbe
constrained by the rules set by Kyoto if it passes a climate change bill. As a result, even though
Kyoto does not recognize emissions reductions from REDD activities, U.S. climate policies could
allowoﬀsetsfromREDDactivities,whichisexactlywhattheLieberman-Warnerbilldid.If passed,
Lieberman-Warnerwouldhaveregulatedcarbonemissionsbyestablishingacap-and-tradescheme
for carbon credits, and it would have allowed oﬀsets from international forest carbon activities
(suchasREDD)forupto10percentof thecap.ThebillfailedtoovercomeaﬁlibusterinJune2008;
however, if a bill with similar oﬀset provisions is passed in the future, it would single-handedly






urrently, opinions diﬀer signiﬁcantly regarding the appropriate scope of REDD
policies. In this report, scope refers to three distinct issues. First is the question
of what types of activities qualify as REDD. Second and related is the question of
whether policies should be project-based or national. Third is the question of
whether REDD policies should encourage other forest carbon activities, such as
AR activities and forest conservation in countries that are not experiencing deforestation.
Shades of REDD
Broadly speaking, all REDD activities can be categorized as projects, policies, or sector activities.
REDDprojectswouldmaintaincarbonstocksinalocalizedarea.Manyof thecurrentREDDpro-
jects focus on forest conservation and the creation of reserves and parks to protect threatened
forests. These place-based REDD projects preserve the carbon stocks on a parcel of land that oth-
erwise would be deforested.
REDDpolicieswouldreformland-usepolicies,suchasagriculturalandtransportationpolicies,
to reduce deforestation and associated emissions. Agricultural subsidies, for example, often cre-
ate incentives to clear forests, and expanded road networks provide access to clear forests and re-
movetimber.Reformingland-usepolicycouldleadtosigniﬁcantreductionsinforestryemissions,
just as reforms in energy policy are expected to reduce emissions rates in the electricity sector.
Sectoral REDD activities would focus on reducing net deforestation rates over an entire coun-
try. A country or province could commit to a target emissions rate from forestry by setting an
emissions cap in the forestry sector. For some developing countries, actively pursuing emissions
targets in the forestry sector might be the most appealing and powerful way for them to partici-
pate in the global eﬀort to mitigate climate change.
Those three shades of REDD—project, policy, and sector targets—capture the diﬀerent scales
at which REDD activities could be implemented, and each has its strengths and weaknesses.
REDDprojectscouldbemodeledaftertheforestryCDM,andsomeprojectdevelopersareready
to begin investing in REDD projects. Because REDD projects would be geographically bound, they
would be easier to implement than REDD policies or sector activities. There are, however, techni-
cal challenges that must be overcome—such as minimizing and accounting for leakage.6 This is
dealt with in more detail later in this chapter.
Policy Design Issues 31Further, emissions from deforestation account for 20 percent of global carbon emissions, and
there is concern that REDD projects alone could not have a meaningful impact on the large mag-
nitude of emissions from deforestation. Policies and sectoral caps that reduce emissions from de-
forestationmaybebettermatchedtothescaleof theproblem.Consequently,theywouldalsore-
quire more coordination, but some countries lack a suﬃciently strong central government or the
proper governance institutions to monitor and enforce these programs.
In reality, countries currently have very diﬀerent capacities on the ground to implement REDD
activities.Aclimatechangepolicycouldallowaspectrumof REDDactivitiesthatcreateincentives
for countries to take actions at the most appropriate scale for them. All three categories of REDD
activities face technical and policy design challenges that must be addressed to ensure an envi-
ronmentally robust mechanism. These challenges diﬀer with each kind of activity. For example,
projectsthatmaintaincarbonstocksonahectareof landwouldrequirediﬀerentaccountingmech-
anisms than sectoral caps that reduce emissions rates over a country’s entire forests. This topic is
discussed further in the following section on national-based and project-based accounting.
National- versus Project-Based Policies
WhetherREDDpolicieswillbebasedonnationalparticipationorbedesignedforproject-basedac-
tivities will signiﬁcantly aﬀect other elements of REDD policies, such as the design of baselines,
protection against leakage, and ensuring permanence. Further, the decision to make policies ei-
thernational-basedorproject-basedmayinﬂuencethewillingnessof creditsuppliers(forestedde-
velopingcountries),projectinvestors,andcreditbuyers(privateentitiesoﬀsettingtheiremissions)
to participate. For this reason, it is important to consider the comparative beneﬁts of national-
and project-based policies, keeping in mind the goals of REDD policies.
National-Based Policies
Apurelynational-basedREDDpolicywouldincludenationalaccountingof forestryemissionsand
national management of REDD projects. Participating countries would commit to reducing their
emissionsfromdeforestation,andcreditswouldbegeneratedbasedonlyonnational-levelforestry
emissions accounting. National governments would manage a portfolio of REDD activities, cred-
its would be awarded to countries, and national governments would then distribute credits and
credit revenues appropriately. As a result, if an individual project reduced deforestation in its area
butdeforestationincreasedabovetheexpectedlevelelsewhereinthecountry,nocreditsmightbe
issued to the country despite the success of the individual project.
If countries agreed to cap forestry emissions, the cap could be either binding or nonbinding.
Theoften-discussednonbindingcapwouldnotpenalizecountriesif theyviolatethecap;theysim-
ply would not receive any of the beneﬁts. Another possibility is a binding cap that would make
countries liable if forestry emissions went above the cap.
Advantagesof national-basedREDDpolicies.National-basedpolicieswouldgivecountriesﬂex-
ibility to decide how to manage their forest resources collectively and adapt to shifting markets
bychangingtheirportfolioof REDDactivities.Countrieswouldsimultaneouslyinvestinnational-
level governance institutions and policy-based activities as well as place-based REDD projects. Na-
tional-based REDD policies would account for in-country leakage. Because of the magnitude of
32 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesLUCFemissions,national-basedREDDpolicieshavetheappropriatescaletoincorporatelargeareas
of forest and minimize forestry emissions.
Disadvantagesof national-basedREDDpolicies.National-basedREDDpoliciesmightcreatebu-
reaucratic procedures that could dissuade would-be investors in forestry projects from participat-
inginthemarket.Thehypotheticalinvestorsmightbehesitanttotiethereturnsof theirprojects
into the overall success of the country in reducing deforestation rates. To date, no analysis has
been conducted regarding the degree to which national-based REDD policies would create nega-
tive incentives for would-be investors.
Further, national-based policies require strong central governments, whether to enforce
forestrypoliciesortoreformnationalagriculturalandtransportationprograms.Insomecases,it
is the lack of strong central governing authority that has allowed the continued high rates of de-
forestation. Thus, national-based REDD policies might discourage participation by subnational
groupsthathavetheinterestandabilitytoabatedeforestationdespitenational-leveldisinterestor
inability.Forexample,considerahypotheticalcountrythathasaweakcentralgovernmentandis
not able to control deforestation in its provinces. One province determines that the potential rev-
enue from carbon credits makes it advantageous to participate in a REDD program. Although this
provincemighthavewell-designedREDDprojectsthatprotectagainstleakageandimpermanence,
it has no control over forestry activities in the rest of the country. If deforestation rates increase
in other provinces, its credit-generating projects would be diluted, and its incentive to invest in




learned from forestry projects generating credits for the voluntary market. Project-based REDD
policies could include both the project and the policy activities described earlier. Project develop-
ers could sell credits directly to the market or to third-party brokers. Protocols and methodolo-
gies, such as those developed by the Voluntary Carbon Standard, could ensure high-quality de-
sign to establish project baselines and minimize leakage (VCS 2007). Third-party entities could
verifycreditgeneration.Revenueswouldgototheprojectagentsratherthanbeingdistributedby
national entities, as in the national-based policies, above.
Advantages of project-based REDD policies: Project-based REDD policies would allow bottom-
up participationby eco-entrepreneurs andprogressiveprovinces thathaveinvested intheir capac-




implement REDD projects. A hypothetical investor in project development would maintain some
control over the investment and might be more inclined to participate in the market.
Disadvantagesof project-basedREDDpolicies.Project-basedREDDpoliciesaresmallerinscale
than national-based policies, do not easily account for leakage, and do not clearly assign liability
if emissions targets are not met. Given the magnitude of forestry emissions, project-based poli-
Policy Design Issues 33cies risk having a small impact. As is the case with the CDM, project-based REDD policies might not
substantially engage developing countries in the climate change discourse and would not en-
courage developing countries to consider emissions commitments. Project-level REDD policies
would have to address other shortcomings of the CDM, such as issues of additionality, the quality
and robustness of credits, and whether sustainable development goals could be realized.
Hybrids
Numerous conceivable hybrid arrangements could enmesh the national- and project-based ap-
proaches described above. Below, two potential hybrid approaches are discussed. The ﬁrst was
proposed by Pedroni and Streck (2007) as the Nested Approach. The second is a variation of na-
tional-based approaches and pairs national-level commitments with project-level activities and
payments.
Nested Approach. Immediate, project-based REDD activities would be paired with the eventual
transition to a national-based REDD program. Such an approach would accommodate hetero-
geneityinthecapacitytoimplementREDDprogramsbyallowingsubnationalentitiestogenerate
credits through REDD projects. During the project phase, credits would be issued to project rep-
resentatives.Hypothetically,theprojectphasewouldfacilitatelearningandcapacitybuildingand
build momentum among country agents and among investors. After a given threshold—which
could be based on forest area, as proposed by Pedroni and Streck (2007), or temporal—the coun-
try would transition to a national REDD policy in which accounting and credit generation would
occur at the national level, and the national government would distribute credits appropriately.
The transition from project to national scope outlined in the Nested Approach takes advan-
tageof existingcapacitybysubnationalentitieswhilemaintainingfocusonthemagnitudeof the
issue, which can only be addressed by national-level commitments. Although this approach ac-
commodates the real-world challenges to implementing eﬀective national-based REDD policies, it
is not clear that appropriate incentives exist to make the transition from project-level to national-
level commitments. Additionally, once the transition is made to national accounting, investors
may face disincentives to engage with national entities—similar to the disincentives they would
have faced in outright national programs. Thus, there may be perverse incentives for the subna-
tionalentitiesandprojectinvestorstostallthetransitiontothenationalphaseof theprogram.As
a result, it may be more appropriate to have a temporal threshold: after XX years, a country must
transition to national-based REDD program, barring extenuating circumstances.
National commitments with project-level investments. The success of REDD policies relies on
the coordination between private interest in carbon credits and public interest in reduction of
forestry emissions. Ideally, payments would be made to the landowner or user because it is this
entitythatmustconsideralternativeusesfortheland(KarousakisandCorfee-Morlot2007).If po-
tential payments for REDD activities are more than the potential returns from clearing the forest,
landowners and users will ﬁnd that conserving forests is in their best interest as well as the public
interest. Because of investor reluctance to entwine investment returns with government perfor-
mance, it is conceivable that project investors would prefer to work directly with the landowners
and users. Given these interests, a REDD policy could pair project-level private investments with
national guarantees of quality, additionality, permanence, and leakage management. The result-
ing credit revenues would be split between project agents and the government. In a hypothetical
34 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountrieshybrid scenario, national governments would authorize private or public entities to develop and
implement REDD activities and generate REDD credits. Private entities could invest in speciﬁc pro-
jectsorportfoliosof projects,freefromgovernmentintervention.However,therewouldbeana-
tional reference rate of deforestation emissions to guarantee additionality. In payment for ab-
sorbing some of the risk, the government could charge a levy on the credits generated by the
project. A question that needs to be addressed is how investors would be compensated if a pro-
ject was successful but the host country missed its emissions target.
Consideration for Other Forest Carbon Activities
Much of the REDD debate focuses on countries with high deforestation rates. However, some ar-
gue that REDD activities must be included in a broad forest carbon policy that includes all activi-
ties that maintain or increase reserves of forest carbon (Terrestrial Carbon Group 2008). Such a
policywouldincludereducingemissionsincountrieswithhighdeforestationrates,increasingfor-
est cover through AR activities, and maintaining forest carbon in countries that have low defor-
estation rates.




tries is to reward countries that have deforestation rates below the global mean or some other
agreed-uponreferencerate(Molliconeetal.2007;daFonsecaetal.2007).DaFonsecaetal.(2007)
coined the phrase preventivecrediting and estimate that such preventive credits would increase the
potential supply of REDD credits by only 1.3 to 6.5 percent.7 Although this begins to ameliorate
concernsthatpreventivecreditswouldswamptheREDDmarket,itassumes100percentreduction
in forestry emissions. The da Fonseca et al. (2007) study provides a sense of the supply of pre-
ventive credits compared with the potential supply of REDD credits, but it raises questions about
the impact of these credits on the REDD market at diﬀerent carbon prices when deforestation is
less than 100 percent.
Onedrawbackof preventivecreditingisthatitmayleadto“hotair.”If countriesthatcurrently
havelowratesof deforestationareissuedcarboncreditsasanincentivetokeepdeforestationrates
low, they can sell their credits to Annex 1 countries to meet their obligations. In this way, preven-
tive crediting may allow for more emissions than would be allowed otherwise. This eﬀect would
be more dramatic at low carbon prices: 100 percent of potential preventive credits can be issued
at minimal carbon prices because there is initially no cost to continue the business-as-usual (BAU)
practices that result in low deforestation rates. These are not additional emissions reductions;
rather,theyareemissionslevelsthatwouldhaveoccurredwithoutincentives.Atverylowcarbon
prices, the total potential supply of preventive credits would be generated before the price rose
high enough to fund a single REDD credit. This is not to say that preventive credits are not impor-
tant or fair. As more countries enter into a REDD policy, preventive credits will deter transnational
leakage8(discussedlaterinthischapter).Asaresult,restrictionsonthesupplyof preventivecred-
its may be necessary; otherwise it may not be appropriate to use the carbon market to create in-
centives to maintain current deforestation rates.
Policy Design Issues 35Given the limitations surrounding forestry credits under the CDM, activity in the forest credit
market is small. Thus, there has been some discussion of including AR in a broader forest carbon
policy with REDD activities. Internationally, the importance of biological sequestration through
AR has been acknowledged. However, the current REDD debate has thus far deliberately excluded
ARactivities(UNFCCC2007a,2007b),presumablybecauseof areluctancetofurthercomplicatethe
already complex REDD debate. There may be more latitude in forthcoming U.S. climate change
policies because in the current discussions, mention of biological sequestration does not distin-
guish among aﬀorestation, reforestation, and avoided deforestation activities.
Scope Discussion
An international REDD policy does not necessarily have to limit itself to one of the three types of
REDDactivity—projects,policies,orsectoractivities—butcouldallowaspectrumof activities,ac-
knowledging that countries diﬀer in the pressures on their forests and their abilities to manage
and monitor forests.
Whetheritisof onetypeoracombination,aREDDpolicycouldbebuiltaroundeithernational
commitments or project-based activities. Given the overarching objective to reduce carbon emis-
sions, national commitments are better suited to reaching this goal. In reality, countries diﬀer in
their ability to implement REDD activities, and a purely national system might discourage partici-
pation by subnational entities that are able and interested in participating in a REDD market. Hy-
brid approaches that allow subnational participation can be designed to be inclusive, accommo-
dating the diﬀerences among countries while also addressing the magnitude of the problem.
Forestsarecomplexecosystemsthatsimultaneouslysequester,store,andemitcarbon.Anum-
brella forest carbon policy that included REDD activities, forest conservation activities, and AR ac-
tivitieswouldaccountforallof thecarbonﬂuxesof forestecosystems.However,itiscomplicated
andtime-consumingtodesignapolicyforjustoneof thesefunctions.Althoughecosystem-based
management is ideal, the realities of crafting environmental policies might impede the creation
of ecosystem-based policies.
Monitoring
In recent years, the international climate change community has grown increasingly conﬁdent in
the ability to measure deforestation. This is in contrast to a decade ago when concerns over the
ability to monitor tropical deforestation and degradation drove some of the original reluctance
to consider REDD as a measurable means of CO2 mitigation. Since then, advances in monitoring
methodsandtechnologieshaveassuagedmanyof theinitialconcerns.Ata2006workshopof the
UNFCCC’sSubsidiaryBodyforScientiﬁcandTechnologicalAdvice,theconvenedexpertsconcluded
that the technology and methods currently exist to adequately measure deforestation, predomi-
nantly through remote sensing.
Nevertheless, cost-eﬀectiveness remains an unresolved issue. The European Commission’s
Joint Research Centre notes that most remote sensing data are freely accessible on the Internet at
aresolutionof 20to30m(Molliconeetal.2007).Untilnow,muchof thelow-resolutiondatahave
beencheapbecausenationalgovernmentshaveabsorbedthecostof buildingandlaunchingsatel-
lites, and the marginal cost of producing and processing images is low. The availability of cheap
3 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountrieslow-resolution imagery will continue as long as governments keep the current suite of low- to
medium-resolution satellites updated; however, this is not guaranteed. High-resolution images
are more expensive because of the technology needed for transmission, processing, and inter-
pretation. Although the future cost of low-resolution imagery is uncertain, it appears that funds
from the carbon market or some other source will be necessary to incorporate high-resolution
imagery into a forest monitoring program.
The accuracy and cost-eﬀectiveness of REDD monitoring relies on the intersection of three
factors:
∫ themannerinwhichforestcategoriesandcarbondensitiesaredeﬁned,whichaﬀectstherequired
resolution of remote sensing imagery, and thus the cost of monitoring;
∫ whether distinctions among forest categories can be monitored using remote sensing; and
∫ whether changes in carbon stocks can be calculated using a combination of remote sensing and
carbon stock information.
Forest Categories and Carbon Density
Aforestmonitoringprogrambeginswiththedeﬁnitionof forest—essentially,what’sinandwhat’s
out. Approaches that use simple, broad deﬁnitions and categorize land into a minimal number of
forest categories (such as forest or nonforest) are easy and cost-eﬀective but sacriﬁce accuracy in
estimates of carbon stocks. With current technology, it is possible to have a more accurate mon-
itoring program that incorporates multiple categories of forest, such as intact forest, nonforest,
and levels of degraded and nonintact forest. However, such a scheme would require more high-
resolution imagery and more ground-truthing, and thus would be more costly.
AccordingtoUNFCCC,aforestisdeﬁnedbyaminimumtreecoverof 10percent,thoughcoun-
tries can choose more stringent crown cover criteria (DeFries et al. 2006). This binary, forest-non-
forest classiﬁcation makes monitoring through remote sensing relatively easy because determin-
ing whether a landscape has more or less than 10 percent forest cover is a fairly coarse estimate
that can be measured with medium-resolution remote sensing imagery. However, this classiﬁca-
tion mechanism can also ignore forest degradation that might signiﬁcantly deplete carbon stocks
in what is categorized as a forest. For example, according to the UNFCCC deﬁnition, a forest with
100 percent tree cover could lose 70 percent of tree cover—and 70 percent of its carbon stocks—
but still be categorized as a forest, with no acknowledgement that it is not a fully intact forest, or
that carbon stocks have been degraded.
Forestdegradationisimportanttoconsiderindevelopingamonitoringprogram.Forestdegra-
dation is the reduction of canopy cover or biomass in a forest resulting from ﬁre, logging, wind-
felling, or other such events. For all practical purposes, degraded forest is synonymous with nonin-
tact forest. Forest degradation can account for a signiﬁcant loss of carbon stocks and can be less
costly to abate than deforestation (Trines et al. 2006). Although the inclusion of forest degrada-
tion in monitoring programs allows for more accurate measurements of carbon stocks, it also
addscomplexityandtechnicalrequirements.Forestdegradationismorediﬃculttodetectandhas
diﬀerent driving forces than deforestation. It can be caused, for example, by gradual overuse by a
largenumberof peopleinwhatispracticallyanopenaccessarrangement.Studieshavefoundthat
returnsfromthistypeof degradationactivitiesarelow,andthatforestdegradationcanbeabated
Policy Design Issues 3withtheestablishmentof alocalgovernanceinstitution(Trinesetal.2006).Degradationcanalso
result from large-scale selective logging, which is more costly to abate.
Forestdegradationcanbedeﬁnedbyatreecovercriterion,aforestbiomasscriterion,orsome
combination thereof. The decision of how to deﬁne degradation and whether to monitor it will
aﬀect the cost and complexity of a monitoring program.
Molliconeetal.(2007)suggestacategorizationschemethatdivideslandintointactforest,non-
intactforest,andnonforest,based ona combinationof canopycovercriteria and humanimpact cri-
teria. This scheme accounts for the degradation of carbon stocks that can occur in forests. Al-
though this scheme allows for more accurate accounting of carbon stocks, it is also more costly
and more diﬃcult to employ because of the higher-resolution imagery required to distinguish
among forest categories.
Measurement of Distinctions Among Categories
Anumberof studieshaveconcludedthatcurrenttechnologycanaccuratelymeasuretropicalde-
forestation (DeFries et al. 2005, 2006; UNFCCC 2006; Mollicone et al. 2007). However, continued
monitoring capabilities rely on the successful launch of the latest Landsat sensor, scheduled for
2010, without which land cover monitoring will be compromised (DeFries et al. 2005). Existing
data will allow for the establishment of baseline deforestation rates against which current rates
can be compared (DeFries et al. 2005). Table 3.1 provides an overview of the technologies avail-
able to monitor deforestation.
Geographicandecologicalcharacteristics,suchasseasonalityof forests,slope,andcloudcover
aﬀect the choice of appropriate methodologies. For example, a deciduous forest in a temperate
climate would have to be observed in the summer lest it appear not to meet a forest canopy cri-
terion. Other types of forests would have to be monitored multiple times per year. Although no
single methodology will be appropriate for all forest types, many suitable methods and protocols
exist or can be developed through the adaptation of existing methodologies.
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DeFries et al. (2006)
SENSOR EXAMPLES OF UTILITY FOR
RESOLUTION CURRENT SENSORS MONITORING COST
Very high (<5m) IKONOS, Quickbird Validation over small Very high
areas of results from
coarser-resolution
analysis
High (10–60m) Landsat, SPOT HRV, Primary tool to identify Low/medium
AWiFs LISS III, CBERS deforestation (historical) to
medium/high (recent)
Medium (250–1000m) MODIS, SPOT Consistent global Low or free
Vegetation annual monitoring to
identify large clearings
(>10–20 ha) and locate
“hotspots” for further
analysis with high
resolutionAlthough the technological and methodological capabilities exist to monitor deforestation,
high-resolution imagery and the associated analysis are often costly. To lower costs, diﬀerent hot-
spot and statistical sampling methodologies have been developed to minimize the need for high-
resolution images, outlined in Figure 3.1.
If forestdegradationisdeﬁnedbycanopycover,themethodologiestomeasuredeforestation
canbeappliedtoforestdegradation.However,forestdegradationcanbeidentiﬁedonlywithvery
high resolution imagery; thus, measurement of degradation is more costly and requires more vi-
sual image analysis than measurement of deforestation. If degradation is measured by other for-
est attributes, such as carbon stocks or ecological function, it will be less readily observable
through remote sensing and will require ground-truthing or other measures.
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual Observation Framework for Monitoring Forest Changes and Related Carbon Emissions,
Integrating Information from Different Data Sources
Sources: image reproduced from DeFries et al. (2006); interpretation from DeFries et al. (2006) and Trines et al. (2006
Notes: Due to practical limitations of monitoring, such as trained visual interpreters, algorithmic analysis by computers, and costs, methods exist to re-
duce the costs and time needed for analysis of remote sensing data. Routine “wall-to-wall” analysis that covers the entire forested area at high resolu-
tion allows for the identification of leakage; however, it may not be practical because of resource constraints. Alternatively, areas to be analyzed at high
resolution can be identified through expert knowledge, “hot spot” identification by medium-resolution data and global observations, and/or statistical
sampling. Information regarding carbon stocks in regional forests—which is available from FAO reports, forest inventories, and ground-truthing—in-
forms estimates of carbon emissions.
Global observations
ı Global observations by medium-resolution sensors (250–1000
m) such as MODIS/ MERS
ı Appropriate for the identification of hotspots of land-cover
change: large fire and deforestation events (>10 ha)
Regional /national observations
Wall-to-wall mapping
ı High-resolution sensors (10–60 m), such as Landsat, SPOT,
CBERS, combined with ground-truthing and ancillary data
ı Can identify areas of anthropogenic land-cover change (5–10 ha)
ı Can be used to construct baseline
Sampling hotspots and forest degradation
ı Very high-resolution sensors (<5 m), such as IKONOS and
Quickbird; aerial photography; radar (SAR); LiDAR; visual/ dig-
ital interpretation of high-resolution images
ı Can identify areas of anthro. land-cover change (<0.5–1 ha)
ı Can identify carbon stocks
Fine-scale /in-situ observations
ı Nat’l or regional forest inventories and FAO statistics
ı Existing standard data from IPCC
ı Plot-based sampling of carbon stocks (ground-truthing)
ı Targeted remote surveys
ı Models relating changes in forest biomass to changes in carbon
stocks to carbon emissions
Hot spot/large
deforestation detection




Wall-to-wall mapping Sampling approachMeasurement of Changes in Carbon Stocks
A change in carbon stocks is a function of a change in the biomass of a forest. Changes in carbon
stocks are not readily discernible with basic remote sensing methodologies and require a combi-
nation of ground-truthing and high-resolution remote sensing (Schlamadinger et al. 2005; Trines
et al. 2006). Forest degradation and changes in carbon stocks become discernible when very high




that estimate the carbon content of a forest based on its region and type. Although inexpensive,
these tables produce conservative estimates with high uncertainty.
Monitoring Discussion
Deforestation
The international climate change community now has conﬁdence in the ability to monitor defor-




of production are low; thus, once these systems are in place, monitoring deforestation is satisfac-
torilycost-eﬃcient.Currently,theUnitedStates,Europe,Canada,Japan,China,Brazil,Korea,Rus-
sia, Thailand and India have satellites that monitor changes in forest cover and land use. Private
companies have diﬀerent cost recovery and pricing schemes. Although remote sensing data from
private companies are more expensive, it is conceivable that a company could negotiate a moni-
toring regime, with a consortium of nations contributing to the infrastructure cost.
Monitoring Infrastructure
The sensors and satellites currently used to monitor deforestation have a limited life expectancy.
The continued ability to monitor deforestation using current methodologies relies on the suc-
cessful launch of the Landsat sensor scheduled for 2010, and more generally the continued dedi-
cation to remote sensing programs. To date, there have been no cost-beneﬁt analyses of remote
sensing infrastructure in the context of climate change and the carbon market.
Forest Carbon Inventories
Measuring emissions from deforestation has three components. First, a forest inventory assesses
the state and extent of a forest. A monitoring program must then monitor changes in that forest,
ideally using a combination of remote sensing and ﬁeld sampling on the ground. Information on
changesinforestcoverisnotyetusefulunlessthecarboncontentof thatforestisalsoknown.Ex-
tensiveﬁeldsamplingisanaccuratebutcostlywaytogetforestcarboninformation.Amorecost-
eﬀective but less accurate alternative is to use look-up tables that estimate the carbon content for
4 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesdiﬀerent types of forests. Estimates of carbon stocks for diﬀerent types of intact forests are avail-
able in the literature (Houghton 2003a; Achard et al. 2004; FAO 2006; Mollicone et al. 2007). Al-
thoughthemethodologiesforconductingforestinventoriesareestablished(theﬁrststepinmon-
itoring forestry emissions), reliable forest inventories do not exist for some countries, and thus




still more costly and more complex than monitoring deforestation. Although the challenges to
monitoring forest degradation are great, degradation contributes signiﬁcantly to forestry emis-
sions, and the drivers of degradation may be easier to abate than the drivers of deforestation.
Additionally,informationonthecarbonstocksof degradedforestsispoor.Thelackof carbon
data on degraded forests could be addressed by pairing very high resolution remote sensing with
signiﬁcant ground-truthing. Alternatively, rule-of-thumb assumptions could be made about the
carbon stocks in a nonintact or degraded forest. For example, Mollicone et al. (2007) propose, for
the sake of simplicity, an assumption that nonintact forests have half the carbon stocks of intact
forests of the same type.
Baselines
Foranytypeof REDDprogramtosucceed,itmustexhibitquantitativereductionsof deforestation
rates below baseline, or business-as-usual, scenarios. Thus, deﬁning the baseline will signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the “success” of a REDD program. To deﬁne baselines, one must address four questions.
∫ Should baselines be at the project level or national level?
∫ Are the data suﬃcient to set a baseline deforestation rate?
∫ How should a baseline be set to maintain equity, encourage participation, and reduce the risk of
hot air?
∫ Should baselines change over time?
Appropriate Geographic Scope for Baselines9
Thechoiceof theappropriategeographicscopeforsettingbaselineswillbeinﬂuencedbythefun-
damental decision of whether REDD policies will be project-based or national-based. If REDD poli-
cies are based on national emissions, national baselines would be appropriate. The host country
would inevitably monitor the emissions of its portfolio of REDD projects, and thus would also es-
tablishprojectbaselines.However,thenationalbaselinewouldbetheimportantonebecausethe
country would generate credits based on national deforestation rates compared with its national
baseline. If REDD policies are project-based, baselines would have to incorporate areas that are at
riskof leakageaswellastheprojectareaitself.Dependingontheprojectsizeandtheriskof leak-
age, a national baseline might be necessary. Project-based baselines would provide a BAU scenario
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Mollicone et al. (2007)
Notes: Examples of how credits could be generated for a country with a
“high” forest conversion rate (a), and a country with a “low” conversion rate
(b). GCB/2 ( ) is the global reference rate against which national de-
forestation rates are compared.
In scenario (a), the country has a national baseline deforestation rate greater
than the global reference rate. In the subsequent accounting period, they de-
crease their deforestation rate below their national baseline, and thus gen-
erate credits (RCR).
In scenario (b), the country has a national baseline rate less than the global
reference rate. In the subsequent accounting period, they increase their de-
forestation rate. However, because the new deforestation rate is still less
than the global reference rate, they generate credits proportional to the dif-
ference between the global reference rate and the new deforestation rate.
Note that credits are generated as a function of the difference between the
new deforestation rate and the global reference rate; the national baseline
(NCB) serves simply to categorize this country into scenario (b).against which to compare the actual deforestation rate. National baselines would also be neces-
sary to determine if leakage occurred, meaning that reducing deforestation in the project site
caused an increase in deforestation in other forests. The number of credits generated would have
to be adjusted to account for that leakage.
Some proposed REDD policies require a global baseline against which national baselines could
be compared (Mollicone et al. 2007). To create incentives for both (a) countries with high defor-
estationratestoreducetheirratesof forestconversionand(b)countrieswithlowconversionrates
to maintain them, Mollicone et al. (2007) suggest a global reference rate.10 In their scheme, for
countries in category (a), credits are generated by decreases in national rates of deforestation; for
countriesincategory(b),creditsarebasedonthediﬀerencebetweentheglobalreferencerateand
the national rate (Figure 3.2). Mollicone et al.’s (2007) global reference rate would be a compo-
nent of a REDD policy based on national-level commitments.
Data for Setting Baseline Deforestation Rates
Remotely sensed data from aircraft and satellites dating back to the early 1990s are suﬃcient to
measure changes in forest area with conﬁdence (DeFries et al. 2006; Mollicone et al. 2007). Al-
though data to set national and international forest cover baselines are available at relatively low
cost, information on carbon stocks and forest inventories is not uniformly available. Degradation
baselines are possible in some regions where information is available.
Maintaining Equity, Encouraging Participation, and Reducing Risks
Thebaselinescenariosthatwillbeadvantageous,andthuspoliticallypreferable,toacountrywill
depend on its historical and current patterns of deforestation. In all cases, deforestation is occur-
ringwithinthecontextof naturalcyclesthataﬀectforestcover.Therefore,anybaselinethatdraws
on historical rates must consider a large enough period to distinguish natural variation from an-
thropogenic forest change.
Using historical data from a deﬁned period (such as 1990 to 2000) will avoid perverse incen-
tives to increase short-term deforestation in anticipation of establishing baselines but might not
capturecurrentdeforestationratesandtrends.Ontheotherhand,somecountriesmayhavefaced
historicallylowratesof deforestationbecauseof politicalunrest(suchasDemocraticRepublicof
Congo and Colombia) but face deforestation pressure in the near future if the political situation
stabilizes. However, using recent and projected rates of deforestation to create baselines would
penalizecountriesthathavesuccessfullyimplementedforestconservationpolicies(suchasCosta
Rica) and reward those with weak governance institutions. This tension between helping the lag-
gardsandrewardingtheleadersisafundamentaltrade-oﬀinallmarketpolicies.Althoughthein-
clination is to reward leaders for conserving their forests, doing so through the issuance of trad-
able carbon credits could lead to environmental harm because it would allow more carbon to be
emitted than under BAU scenarios.
The capability exists to set objective baselines, but doing so might discourage participation.
Ontheotherhand,anegotiatedliberalbaselinethatismoresubjectivemightgeneratehotairand
credits that are not the result of real reductions in emissions. Pfaﬀ and Kerr (2007) argue that ac-
curate baselines are essential to ensuring environmental integrity because both the seller and the
Policy Design Issues 43buyer would enjoy greater beneﬁts from lax baselines and thus are incentivized to underestimate
baselines to the detriment of emissions levels.
Schlamadingeretal.(2005)suggestanalternativeinvolvingatargetband,orrange,thatcaptures
acountry’smostlikelyemissionslevels(Figure3.3).Withinthisband,countrieswouldgeneratedis-
counted credits. The discount rate applied to the credit would change with proximity to the target
bounds. Below the lower bound, countries could generate full-value credits for incremental emis-
sions reductions. The upper bound would be set high enough that the probability of exceeding it
would be low. The liberally set upper bound would ameliorate the risk of “run-away” noncompli-
ance because a country would increasingly beneﬁt from incremental decreases in emissions.
Baselines That Change over Time
Although baselines must remain constant for multiple compliance periods, there are some draw-
backs to making baselines permanent. For example, after successfully implementing REDD pro-
gramsoveraperiodof time,acountrywillenteranewBAUscenario,anditmightbeappropriate
toreevaluatethebaseline.Attheotherendof thespectrum,if acountrydecidestoparticipatein
REDD programs but is not initially able to abate deforestation, its deforestation rate may move so
far above its baseline that subsequent reductions in deforestation rates would not yield credits.
Again,insuchsituationsitmightbeappropriatetoreevaluatethebaseline.Insum,baselinesthat
are adjusted over time would create the ﬂexibility to adapt to new deforestation patterns and to






Schlamadinger et al. (2005)
Notes: Instead of a threshold baseline with a single emissions target, Schlamadinger et al. (2005) suggest a target spec-
trum that takes into account historic data and future projections. The graph on the right shows how credits would be
discounted within the target spectrum based on their proximity to the bounds of the spectrum. Full credits would be
generated only when emissions rates decreased below the lower bound of the spectrum.
Note that the baseline spectrum in this scheme is based on emissions and not deforestation rates or conversion rates,
as seen in previously discussed proposals. However, hypothetically, this same model with a target spectrum, instead of











Historic, remotely sensed data can be used to set baselines. However, because of heterogeneity
in countries’ recent patterns of deforestation and in the availability of forest carbon inventories,
it will be diﬃcult to ﬁnd a single baseline methodology that is appropriate for all would-be par-
ticipants.
Target Band
Employing a target band instead of a threshold baseline appears to accommodate the greatest
rangeof forestchangehistories.However,atargetbandwillmakeitdiﬃculttogeneratefull-value





of individual countries. Additionally, it is important to consider the eﬀect on individual countries





cern over “negative leakage,” in which reducing deforestation in one area would simply shift the
deforestationactivitytoanotherarea.If leakageoccurs,beneﬁtsfromaREDDprojectwouldbedi-
luted by increased deforestation and increased emissions elsewhere such that there would be lit-
tle or no net decrease in emissions at the national or global scale. Although leakage is a concern
whenconsideringREDD,leakagecanoccurinanysectoraﬀectedbyGHGmitigation.Forexample,
inFrance,thecostof productionforcarbon-intensiveproductshasincreasedbecauseregulations
in Europe limit carbon emissions. As a result, prices of some exports such as cement and steel
have increased. Construction companies in Singapore may choose to purchase materials from
China rather than France because China currently has no regulations limiting carbon emissions,
makingtheseproductscheaper.Asaresult,thebeneﬁtsfromreducedcarbonemissionsinFrance
would be diluted by increased carbon emissions in China. As with leakage in other sectors, leak-
age in the forest sector can be eliminated only by developing a global policy framework that ap-
plies everywhere.
The speciﬁc characteristics of the forestry project and the market driving deforestation will
aﬀect whether the risk of leakage is large or small. Generally, stopping deforestation driven by
subsistence activities will risk smaller leakage than stopping deforestation driven by commercial
markets. In the latter example, supposing the forest would be cleared for timber, decreasing de-
forestation may cause the market price for timber to increase just enough to make it cost-eﬀec-
tive for others to cut down forests that they had previously conserved. This is called market leak-
age and is hard to manage because the price on the international market changes as supply and
Policy Design Issues 45demand shifts. Activity shifting leakage occurs when the actual agents of deforestation go some-
where else. Activity-shifting leakage is easier to manage because the agents of deforestation are
geographicallybound.Activity-shiftingleakageandmarketleakagearediscussedinfurtherdetail
in the following sections.
Chomitz (2006) argues that even where leakage is large, it is probably less than 100 percent.




measures that encourage agricultural intensiﬁcation in nonforested areas that can soak up the la-
bor, commodity supply, and capital diverted by forest protections (Sohngen and Brown 2004;
Chomitz 2006).
Activity-Shifting Leakage
Activity-shifting leakage occurs when the activity that caused the deforestation in a project area
is displaced to a location outside the project boundaries. For example, farmers inside a conserva-
tionprojectareamightshiftoperationsandclearforestsoutsidetheprojectarea.Activity-shifting
leakage can be largely controlled at the project level through project selection and project design
measuresthataddressboththeproximatecausesof deforestation(land-usechangeandforestcon-
version)andtheunderlyingdrivers(e.g.,poverty,agriculturalpolicies,andlandtenure)(Schwarze
et al. 2002; Sohngen and Brown 2004).
The risk of activity-shifting leakage is a function of the physical mobility of the activity (in-
cluding labor and capital) as well as the physical availability of forested land. For example, if cap-
ital is not available to invest in new deforestation activities, or if additional forest is not available
tocutdown,activity-shiftingleakagewillbelesslikelythanif thesecircumstanceswerereversed.
Project design measures to minimize activity-shifting leakage would integrate forest conser-
vation with sustainable development activities that would address the socioeconomic drivers of
deforestation. For example, the Noel Kempﬀ Mercado forest conservation project in Bolivia con-
trolled activity-shifting leakage by pairing equipment retirement schemes (addressing the proxi-
mate causes of deforestation) with sustainable sources of ﬁrewood and local employment (ad-
dressing the underlying drivers) (Schwarze et al. 2002; Sohngen and Brown 2004). Thus it is
possible to develop design standards and protocols to minimize the risk of activity-shifting leak-
age for a REDD project.
The Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS)—a standard under which REDD projects selling credits
inthevoluntarymarketreceiveaccreditationif theyhavemetcertainstringentcriteria—outlines
methodologies for calculating and accounting for leakage (VCS 2007). Under the VCS, predicted
leakage must be calculated in the “leakage belt” and then subtracted from the potential number
of creditsgenerated(VCS2007).TheVCSrequiresthatprojectsaccountforactivity-shiftingleak-
age, any increases in emissions due to measures implemented to prevent leakage, and increases
in emissions due to the increasedconsumptionof fossilfuelsforimplementingforestprotection,
monitoring, and surveillance tasks within the leakage belt (VCS 2007). Areas subject to leakage
must be monitored throughout the duration of the project.
4 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesMarket Leakage
Marketleakageoccurswhenaprojectorpolicychangesthesupply-and-demandequilibrium,caus-
ing market actors to shift. That is, if a project decreases timber supply, prices will rise, which will
bemetbyincreasedsupply(andincreaseddeforestation)fromoutsidetheprojectarea.Themag-
nitude of market leakage is aﬀected by the elasticity of demand and supply of forest and forest
products.
If driversof deforestationarecommercial,suchastimberproduction,supplyisprobablyelas-
tic, and a small increase in timber prices will increase timber harvests outside the REDD project
area to meet timber demand on the world market. This will be especially true if perfect substi-
tutes exist for the timber taken oﬀ the market and the timber was traded on a small, niche mar-
ket where reduced supply in one locale will cause prices on the international market to increase.
For example, if Bolivian mahogany is a substitute for Brazilian mahogany, and REDD policies in
Brazil decrease the harvest of mahogany trees, harvest of Bolivian mahogany trees will be ex-
pected to increase to meet international demand. If supply is elastic, the risk of market leakage
will be high. Leakage will be lessened if other operators respond to unmet demand by intensify-
ing production without using increased land (Chomitz 2006, 2007). The risk of market leakage
also depends on the size of the market and whether REDD policies aﬀect global prices.
On the other hand, if drivers of deforestation involve subsistence, such as fuelwood harvest-
ing and subsistence agricultural practices, the consumers of forest products are not part of an in-
ternationalmarket.Withsubsistence-drivendeforestation,forestsareoftenopenaccess,andcosts
for forest resources are limited to the cost of eﬀort to harvest wood or clear land. Activity-shift-
ingleakageisagreaterriskherebutmaybeamelioratedthroughcarefulfront-endprojectdesign.
Although the market leakage risk is low for subsistence activities, REDD policies risk endangering
individuals who rely on forests for their survival. Therefore REDD policies may need to provide
subsistenceforestuserswithsubstituteproductsandactivities,suchassolarcookerstoreplacefu-
elwood and intensive agricultural production on already cleared land to replace subsistence agri-
culture (Chomitz 2006).
Risk of market leakage will depend on the drivers of deforestation, demand elasticity, avail-
abilityof substitutes,andtheabilityof otheroperatorstointensifytheirproduction.Marketleak-
age is not easily controlled but can be measured, modeled, and accounted for through discount-
ing credits according to the estimated leakage (Sohngen and Brown 2004). However, modeling
requires information on markets, which is unavailable in some developing countries.
At least two studies have attempted to estimate LUCF leakage in speciﬁc markets.
∫ Murray et al. (2002) estimated carbon leakage from aﬀorestation, reforestation, and avoided de-
forestation projects in the United States to range from 10 percent in the Paciﬁc Northwest to 90
percent in the Lakes States. Regional diﬀerences resulted from diﬀerences in forest and market
characteristics.
∫ Sohngen and Brown (2004) found that potential in-country leakage from the Noel Kempﬀ Mer-
cado forest conservation project in Bolivia ranged from 5 to 42 percent without discounting car-
bon and 2 to 38 percent with discounting. Sensitivity analysis revealed that demand elasticity and
wood decomposition rates have the largest eﬀects on leakage calculations, with more elastic de-
mand and higher rates of biomass decomposition leading to lower leakage.
Policy Design Issues 4Results from such case studies are not necessarily transferable because of the diﬀerent scale
of forestryprojects,carboncharacteristicsof forests,driversof forestryactivities,mobilityof cap-
ital in Annex 1 countries, and lack of mobility in non-Annex 1 countries. The examples do illus-
tratethatleakagecanbeestimatedbasedonthecharacteristicsof theREDDproject.Itfollowsthat
projects could be selected based on leakage risks, and discount rates could be applied to the pro-
ject credits to account for leakage. These discount rates could be adjusted as the project matures
and actual leakage rates are measured.
Leakage and Scope
Thedecisionof whetherREDDpolicieswillbeproject-basedornational-basedwillaﬀecthowleak-
age is accounted for and mitigated.
∫ Underaproject-basedREDDpolicy,therisksof within-countryleakagewouldhavetobeaccounted
for when issuing credits. Project leakage can be modeled and accounted for; however, the imple-
mentation of some REDD projects suggests that it is better to focus on the prevention and mini-
mization of sources of leakage through understanding the drivers and agents of deforestation
(Brown 2002). International leakage would also be an issue.
∫ Under a national-based REDD policy, within-country leakage is incorporated into the national ac-
countingandcreditgeneration(Schwarzeetal.2002;Santillietal.2005).Internationalleakageto
nonparticipating countries would still be an issue; however, it may be impractical to account for
international leakage because a participating country cannot be penalized for the capacity of an-
other country to resist deforestation pressure. In general, higher levels of participation interna-
tionally would reduce leakage, since there would be fewer recipient countries that would allow
deforestation to leak across their borders.
Leakage Discussion
Leakage is a risk for REDD projects, as it is for any GHG-mitigating project. The magnitude of the
risk depends on the project design, the market forces driving deforestation, the policies and mar-
ket pressures affecting surrounding land, and the level of international participation in REDD
programs.
Project leakage can be minimized through project selection, project design, and complemen-
tary measures that increase agricultural production intensity in other operations in nonforested
areas. It may be possible to control most activity-shifting leakage through design measures that
address the unique drivers of deforestation in each project area. Market leakage at the national
level can be estimated using models that incorporate forest and market characteristics; however,
data are lacking for some developing country forestry markets. In the Noel Kempﬀ case, Brown
(2002) found that it was better to prevent and minimize leakage from the outset than to quantify
and account for it once it had taken place. For this reason, she recommends focusing on speciﬁc




4 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesan issue for accounting. Although international leakage is a risk, it is not easily distinguishable
from a recipient country’s poor forestry practices and might not be able to be reasonably ac-
counted for.
Stakeholder Interests in Credit Design
In designing REDD credits, it is important to consider how design elements such as fungibility, lia-
bility, and permanence will encourage or discourage market participation by project developers,
potential suppliers (such as developing countries), and investors (such as investment banks, ﬁrms
subject to emissions caps, and Annex 1 countries). Design elements must be carefully considered
toavoiddampeningthemitigationpotentialof REDDpolicies.Thus,itisimportanttounderstand
the diﬀerent and sometimes conﬂicting concerns of suppliers, investors, and society.
Project Developers’ Interests
Project developers invest in REDD activities in developing countries. They may sell credits directly
to ﬁrms or to a credit broker. Developers, and the ﬁrms that invest in them, are generally con-
cerned about the ease of doing business in the countries where projects are located. Their con-
cerns include the ease of starting a business, freedom from burdensome regulations and taxes,
and any bureaucratic procedures or taxes that might aﬀect their business. Project developers are
unlikely to want to link investment returns to the performance of a central government in a de-
velopingcountry.Therefore,theyareexpectedtopreferproject-basedREDDaccountinganddirect
payments to the project agent rather than relying on the government to distribute beneﬁts from
credit revenues.
It is likely that many of the initial REDD projects will be developed, at least in part, by individ-
uals and organizations from countries other than the host country. As a result, these project de-
veloperswillalsoprefercountriesthatareopentoforeigninvestmentanddonotpenalizeforeign
companiesoperatingintheircountries.Further,projectdevelopersareconcernedabouttheclar-




erate credits. Whether REDD crediting is national-based or project-based, suppliers are concerned
with whether the potential credit revenues are suﬃcient to fund REDD activities. This is obviously
a function of the credit price and the opportunity costs for alternative land uses, but it is also af-
fected by any taxes or transaction costs that would reduce the funds actually available for the on-
the-ground implementation and management of REDD projects.
In the case of national-level accounting, host countries also have speciﬁc concerns about na-
tional-level REDD policies:
∫ REDD credits may be at odds with domestic forests and land-use policies. Host countries are con-
cerned about maintaining their ability to shift land-use strategies and priorities to take advantage
Policy Design Issues 4of changingmarkets(Chomitz1999).SomecountriesareconcernedthatREDDpolicieswouldde-
tract from national economic development goals and even constrain their sovereignty to make
domestic land-use decisions.
∫ Hostcountriesdonotwantland-usedecisionsintheircountriestobemadebyAnnex-1countries
and the international community.
∫ InadditiontogeneratingsuﬃcientrevenuestofundREDDactivities,REDDcreditsshouldallowrev-
enues to be used for projects that include other co-beneﬁts, such as sustainable development and
biodiversity conservation.
∫ Hostcountriesareconcernedthatbindingemissionscommitmentsinanysectormayhampereco-
nomic development goals and are unjust, given Annex 1 countries’ historical fossil fuel emissions.
∫ TheinitialtransitionfromdeforestationactivitiestoREDDactivitiesislikelytobecapitalintensive
and will require initial ﬁnancing before any credits can be generated.
∫ Host countries are concerned with how REDD policies align with existing in-country institutional
capacitythatmightaﬀecthowREDDactivitiesareimplementedandbeneﬁtsaredistributedamong
stakeholders.
Some of these concerns may be overstated and reﬂect current uncertainty surrounding how
REDD policies would be implemented. Although these concerns might be ameliorated with care-
ful design of REDD policies, other concerns are more diﬃcult to address.
Buyers’ Interests
In a carbon market where REDD credits can be used to meet ﬁrms’ regulatory obligations, buyers
aretheﬁrmswhosecarbonemissionsareregulatedbyaclimatechangepolicy.Whereassuppliers’
interests are broad and encompass ﬁnancing, sovereignty, and sustainable development issues that
stretchfromthenationaltothelocalscale,buyers’interestsaremuchmorefocusedonthecredit’s
cost,itsfungibilityinglobalmarkets,andthemanagementof riskthatmightresulteitherfromin-
vesting in foreign forestry policies or from a lack of integrity in the credit system. Buyers will be
cautious about investing in REDD credits if the accounting or credit design casts doubt on the in-
tegrity of the credits. Some argue that buyers may prefer permanent credits to oﬀset permanent
emissions. Others contend that buyers would prefer temporary credits to bridge the transition to
low-carbon technologies if future credit prices are expected to be lower than present prices.
Society’s Interests
Ultimately,societyasawholeisinterestedinthelarge-scalereductionof carbonemissionsatlow
cost. At the global level, a ton of carbon that is emitted from a car’s tailpipe is the same as a ton
of carbon that is emitted from a burning forest. Generally, society is interested in attaining re-
ductions in carbon emissions at a low cost and/or with the delivery of other co-beneﬁts that it
cares about. Whereas suppliers, buyers, and project developers would beneﬁt from unreasonably
highbaselinessothatmanycreditscouldbegeneratedandsold,society’sinterestinenvironmental
integrity demands strict baselines. High baselines would create hot air: credits for emissions re-
ductions would be generated and traded, but these emissions reductions would have occurred in
5 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriestheabsenceof incentivesfromcredits.Thus,thecreditsarenotreallyadditionaltoaBAUscenario,
and the credits allow the emissions levels to exceed what they would have been without a credit-
ing system. Given this potential for market failure, third-party entities must be involved in estab-
lishing baselines and verifying credit generation.
High-Quality Credits
Expost,third-party-veriﬁedREDDcarboncreditswouldensuretheenvironmentalintegrityof REDD
credits and avoid hot air. Although ex post, third-party accounting ensures integrity, it will have
higher transaction costs because of the required monitoring and accounting. Ex post accounting
isnecessarytoverifyandquantifychangesinthedeforestationrate.However,expostaccounting
createsachallengewithgeneratinginitialfunding.FinancingREDDactivitiesisdiscussedingreater
depth in chapter 4.
Afewfront-enddesignstandardsandmethodologies,suchastheClimate,Community&Bio-
diversityStandards11andSocialCarbonsystem,12requirethatREDDprojectsbeauditedbyathird
party to certify that they meet the criteria of the design standard. Certiﬁcation under a design
standard provides projects with a milestone that they can use to generate ﬁnancing before any
credits are generated.
Stakeholder Interest Discussion
Suppliers’, buyers’, and project developers’ interests diﬀer. Project developers are generally inter-
estedintheeaseof doingbusinessinthehostcountryaswellassecuringﬁnancingbeforethepro-
jectbeginsgeneratingcredits.Assuppliers,hostcountrieswanttomaintainsovereigntyoverland-
use decisions,achieve sustainable developmentandecosystem service co-beneﬁts, haveﬁnancing
for the initial capacity building needed to implement REDD, and ensure equitable distribution of
beneﬁts among stakeholders. Buyers are interested in managing risk, reducing costs, and credit
fungibility.
Society as a whole is interested in environmental integrity. Ex post, third-party-veriﬁed REDD
carboncreditsensurethattheenvironmentalintegrityof thesystemismaintained.Front-endde-
sign standards may also contribute to the delivery of high-quality credits.
Permanence and Liability
Questions of whether reduced emissions from deforestation can be considered permanent are
part of the current debate about REDD. Concerns over permanence are rooted in the idea that
emissions reductions are potentially reversible because of forests’ vulnerability to ﬁres, pest out-
breaks,changesinmanagement,andothernaturalandanthropogenicdisturbances.Thusthegain
fromloweremissionsinoneyearmightbeundonebyexceptionallyhighemissionsinalateryear.
Currently, consensus is lacking as to whether this characteristic of forest carbon makes REDD
inherently diﬀerent from avoided fossil fuel emissions. On one hand, forest carbon is considered
to carry a greater risk of impermanence, and the beneﬁts of carbon storage in one time period
risk being undone in a future time period (Chomitz 1999; Sedjo and Marland 2003; Watson et al.
2000).Ontheotherhand,allemissionsreductionscarrysomeriskof impermanencethatis,low-
Policy Design Issues 51ered emissions in one year somehow lead to higher emission rates in a future year. It can be ar-
gued that the permanence risks associated with forest carbon can be managed such that a reduc-
tion in forestry emissions is no diﬀerent from a reduction in other emissions.
One reason for the uncertainty regarding permanence is that it is diﬃcult to decouple issues
of permanence from issues of scope – that is, whether REDD accounting will be project- or na-
tional-based.Inaworldof project-basedREDDaccountingandpolicies,focuswouldbeonthecar-
bon stocks within the conﬁnes of the project area. A project area would have discrete boundaries
within which carbon stocks would be monitored. In this context, it is easy to imagine that an ac-
cidentalﬁreoradeliberatedecisiontochangelandusecouldreleasecarbonthathadalreadybeen
used to issue credits.
In a world of national-based REDD accounting and policies, focus would be on national emis-




be based on changes in the national rate of deforestation and degradation, and nations could ex-
perimentwithdiﬀerentcombinationsof land-usepoliciestoattainthedesiredemissionsrate.For




one period would seem less likely to result in higher national emissions rates in the future.
What is a Permanent Emissions Reduction?
In the debate over permanence, the underlying question is whether lower emissions rates in one
year are likely to result in raised emissions rates in a future year (suggesting an impermanent re-
duction), or whether the reduction will lead to permanently lower levels of carbon in the atmos-
phere. Permanence here does not mean that a speciﬁc atom of carbon will remain in a forest or
oil reserve forever. “To the extent that the emission displacement propagates forward until the
end of the time horizon, the result is a ‘permanent’ savings” (Watson et al. 2000, 2.3.6.2). To bor-
row an example from the ipcc’s Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, suppose
an individual replaced his traditional incandescent bulbs with compact ﬂuorescents and avoided
one ton of emissions over the life of the compact ﬂuorescent bulbs. This beneﬁt is permanent;
thereisnoriskthatthefossilfuelemissionswillbeaccidentallyreleasedinsubsequentyears.The
beneﬁt will persist even if traditional incandescent bulbs are installed after the compact ﬂuores-
cents burn out (Watson et al. 2000).
ThelightbulbscenarioisillustratedinFigure3.3a,whichshowstheimpactof aone-timeuse
of a compact ﬂuorescent on the stock of fossil fuels, and Figure 3.4, which shows the impact on
the rate of emissions. In Figure 3.3a, note that the reduction in emissions in the ﬁrst time step
causes the time path of consumption to shift out. After this ﬁrst time step, the initial rate of de-
pletion could resume, and stock levels would continue to decrease as oil is burned and CO2 con-
tinues to be emitted. Although the reduction in fossil fuel consumption (and thus emissions rate)
is temporary, the fossil fuel stocks in the ground are greater in every time step than they would
52 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountrieshavebeenwithouttheone-timeuseof thecompactﬂuorescent(thediﬀerencebetweenthebase-
linestocksandthealternativestocksinFigure3.3a).Thus,theoverallreductionintheamountof
CO2 in the atmosphere is permanently less than it would have been without the use of the com-
pact ﬂuorescent bulb.13
Do Emissions Reductions from Deforestation Diﬀer from Fossil Fuel
Emissions Reductions?
Figures 3.3a and 3.4 clearly show how a one-time reduction in emissions rate can result in a per-
manent reduction in atmospheric CO2. It is not a far stretch to substitute the light bulbs in the
aboveexamplewithtropicalforeststounderstandhowaone-timereductionindeforestationrates
could lead to a greater area of standing forest in any given time period, and thus a permanent re-
duction in atmospheric CO2. Reductions would be permanent as long as the baseline deforesta-
tion rate was not exceeded. It is important to note that as in the light bulb example, the emissions
intheatmospherearelowerthanthebaseline,eventhoughtheforestisnotpermanentlyconserved.
Thus, whether a reduction in deforestation emissions has diﬀerent permanence characteris-
ticsthanareductioninfossilfuelemissionsdependsonwhetherfuturedeforestationratearemore




In a world of project-based REDD programs, one can imagine that the carbon beneﬁts of one
forestry project could be reversed if the carbon previously stored in the forest were released
through burning, forest conversions, or other activities. One such incident could produce a de-
forestation spike of such great magnitude that it would nullify all previous beneﬁts, and forest
stocks would return to the baseline scenario. Thus, in the project-based world, it is easy to envi-
sion how emissions reductions could turn out to be impermanent.
However, in a world of national-based REDD activities or reforming land-use policies, a spike
in deforestation rates is, theoretically, less likely because a national government would manage
and monitor a portfolio of REDD policies and projects. Even if REDD activities are implemented
ﬂawlessly, it is possible that one activity might fail; however, it is less likely that all REDD activities
within a country would fail simultaneously. The eﬀect of an unexpectedly high rate of deforesta-
tion in one area could be moderated by successful REDD activities in another area, resulting in net
decreasesindeforestationemissions.Tocreateaspikeinemissionsandundoapreviousperiodof
lowdeforestation,routineeventsoccurringunderthebaseline—whichlikelyincludeburning,for-
est conversion, and other activities—would have to occur at rates higher than the baseline rate,




costs of initial capacity building may be high because of the need to integrate REDD policies with
sectors outside forestry, maintenance of these new forestry management policies may be easier
and less costly than their initial implementation. Once these processes are in place, there may be
someinstitutionallock-inorinstitutionalinertiathatwouldalsomaintaindeforestationratescon-
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Figure 3.3A
Effect of Light Bulb
Use on Fossil Fuel
Stocks
ı ı A: Baseline Stock
(continued use of
incandescent bulb)
ı ı B: Stock with one-
time use of compact
fluorescent
Figure 3.4
Effect of Light Bulb
Use on Emissions
Rates
ı ı A: Baseline
Emissions Rate








ı ı A: Baseline Forest
Stock
ı ı B: Stock with one-
time reductions in
deforestation
ı ı C: Spike in
deforestation rate
(alternate A)
ı ı D: Spike in
deforestation rate
(alternate B)
Notes: Series A in Figure 3.3A represents the time path to consumption of a
fossil fuel stock using traditional incandescent bulbs, which results in a base-
line emissions rate, shown in Figure 3.4.
SeriesBillustratesatemporaryreductioninemissionsratescausedbytheone-
time use of compact fluorescent bulbs, followed by replacement with incan-
descent bulbs and a return to the original emissions rates. Even though the re-
duction in emissions rate is temporary, the savings experienced in the initial
year are carried through to the end of the time period, and the atmosphere has
less carbon in every time step than it would without the reduction in the initial
timeperiod.Thus,thereisapermanentincreaseinthefossilfuelstocksinevery






























































ı ı A: Baseline Forest
Stock
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ı ı C: Spike in
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(alternate A)









ı ı A: Baseline Forest
Stock
ı ı B: Stock with one-
time reductions in
deforestation
ı ı C: Stock with
perpetual reduction of
deforestation
Notes: Series A is the baseline rate of deforestation – that is, what would occur if no mitigation action is taken.
Series B illustrates the effect of reducing the rate of deforestation for one year. Even though the deforestation rate returned
to the baseline rate the following year, the savings experienced in the initial year are carried through to the end of the time
period, and the atmosphere has less carbon in every time step than it would without the reduction in the initial year. As long
as the deforestation rate does not go above the baseline, the benefit of one year’s reduced emissions will be permanent.
Series C and Series D illustrate a spike in emissions rates followed by a return to baseline deforestation rates. Note that the
magnitude of the spike determines whether some or all of the carbon benefits are lost. The extent to which carbon benefits
would be reversed by a spike in deforestation rates depends on the timing, duration, and magnitude of the spike compared






































































TIMEsistently below their baseline and lessen the probability of future spikes in deforestation. In this
way, there would be not only a shift in the rate of forest depletion, as portrayed in Figure 3.5, but
alsoaﬂatteningof thetrajectorysuchthattheforestisactuallygrowingrelativetothebaseline,14
illustrated in Figure 3.7.
One can argue that emissions rates from deforestation have greater uncertainty and variabil-
itythanfossilfuelemissionsrates.However,theuncertaintyindeforestationratesmaynotbeen-
tirely diﬀerent from the uncertainty present in predicting seasonal weather trends, which signiﬁ-
cantlyaﬀectenergyuseandfossilfuelburning.Forexample,anexceptionallycoldwinterfollowed
by a hotter-than-normal summer might cause fossil fuel consumption to spike above baseline ex-
pectations,analogoustothepotentialspikethatcouldbeseenindeforestationrates.Further,some




its are issued based on national deforestation rates. A host country would commit to not exceed-
ing a baseline rate of deforestation in exchange for access to the carbon market and the ability to
sell credits for emissions, even with national-level crediting, the risk of exceeding the baseline de-
forestation rate remains. Thus, it is important to consider how to minimize the risk of imperma-
nence and who bears the liability if emissions reductions turn out to be impermanent.
Buﬀers, Credit Banking, and Reserve Accounts
Because not all deforestation is controllable, buﬀering and banking mechanisms could be incor-
poratedintoREDDpoliciestoensurethatcreditsareindeedpermanent.Buﬀers,creditbanking,and
reserve accounts all refer to a similar arrangement in which a percentage of the credits that could
be generated are held in reserve by a host country to counter the risk that deforestation will in-
crease in the future. For example, if ex post veriﬁcation determined that deforestation rates be-
low the baseline had prevented the emission of 100 tons of carbon, 70 permanent credits could
be traded on the carbon market, and 30 would be deposited in the reserve account. The percent-
age of REDD credits that could be deposited into the reserve account, or buﬀer, would be deter-
mined by the risk of the project and the number of years after the project’s initiation. For exam-
ple, a project occurring within a protected area that had adequate enforcement would have less
riskandrequireasmallerreservethanaprojectoutsideaprotectedarea.If deforestationratesin-
creasedabovethebaseline,thecountrycoulddipintoitsreserveaccount.Reserveaccountscould
be designed to be proportional to the number of credits a country generates. Thus, the quantity
of required deposits into the reserve account would diminish as the reserve account grows. Re-
serveaccounts,buﬀers,andcreditbankingarefundamentallythesameasdiscountingREDDcred-
its; however, they allow full-value credits to be issued.
Although most proposals envision a reserve account for each country, a pooled account may
also be appropriate. An example of such a pooled account is the U.S. nuclear insurance fund, es-
tablished by the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, in which individual operators
have limited liability up to a ceiling amount above which the Price-Anderson fund makes up the
diﬀerence. The Price-Anderson fund is ﬁnanced by obligatory contributions by the nuclear reac-
5 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriestorcompaniesthemselves.Similarly,REDDprojectscouldgeneratebuﬀercreditsthataredeposited
in national reserve accounts as well as an international pooled fund.
Permanent Credits with Host Country Liability
Some proposed REDD policies suggest that the host country accept liability if baseline deforesta-
tion is exceeded in any current or future time period: a country that exceeds its baseline defor-
estationratewouldhavetobuyemissionsreductions.However,withthereserveaccountarrange-
ment, countries would draw upon their reserve in the case of impermanence, and then would
replenishthereserveaccountduringthenextperiodwhencreditsweregenerated.Intheabsence
of host country liability, if REDD credits became impermanent, emissionsreductionswouldbe re-
versedandcarboninexcessof targetlevelswouldbeemittedintotheatmosphere;essentially,the
environment would be liable.
Permanent Credits with Nonbinding Commitments
Some of the resistance to permanent credits comes from developing countries that are opposed
to taking caps on emissions; they argue that emissions caps will stiﬂe needed economic develop-
mentandthatAnnex1countriesareresponsibleforthecurrentpoolof carbonintheatmosphere.
However, it is possible to design a system with national-level accounting and crediting without
binding emissions commitments (Philibert 2000; Philibert and Pershing 2001).
Insteadof anationalcapondeforestationemissions,onecanimagineanonbindingtargetrate
of deforestation emissions. If deforestation emissions were below this reference rate, permanent
credits could be issued and sold. If deforestation emissions exceeded this reference rate, no cred-
itswouldbeissued.Nopenaltieswouldbeimposedonthebuyerorsellerof thecredits;however,
no new credits could be issued until deforestation emissions returned to the reference rate.
This system of nonbinding commitments risks the introduction of hot air—and an increase
in global emissions. This risk might be ameliorated by combining credits generated from non-
binding commitments with set-asides.15 In this case, if the reductions turned out to lack perma-
nence,theywouldhaveonlyasmalleﬀectontheoverallemissionslevelbecausethecreditswould
have beenlimited totheamountof the set-aside. Thedownside toset-asides is thatthey limit the
number of REDD credits that can be used to meet emissions commitments.
Philibert(2000)andPhilibertandPershing(2001)proposeanotheroptionformaintainingthe
integrity of a system using nonbinding commitments that could be employed with a REDD cred-
iting system. A country could have two targets: one nonbinding, and one binding. The binding
emissionstargetwouldbethehigherone;itwouldbesethighenoughnottoconstraineconomic
growth. The nonbinding target would be set low enough that it would eliminate or greatly re-
duce the risk of hot air. The lower, nonbinding target would be the selling target, below which a
country would sell credits. The higher, binding target would be the buying target, above which a
countrywouldhavetopurchasecredits.If actualemissionswerebetweenthetwotargets,notrad-
ingcouldoccurineitherdirection.Adrawbackof thetwo-targetsystemisthatpartieswouldhave
little incentive to make any change in their deforestation practices unless they were close to one
of the targets. If a country were between the targets, it would tend toward inaction. This draw-
back could potentially be remedied by allowing countries between targets to generate gradually
discounted credits, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Thus, incremental changes in deforestation rates
would aﬀect the number of credits issued.
Policy Design Issues 5The concept of a nonbinding target is attractive because it allows for national accounting, it
allows developing countries to fully engage in the carbon market, and it can result in more ambi-
tious targets than could be negotiated with binding commitments. On the other hand, because
targets are not binding, certainty regarding the expected amount of the emissions reduction is
low. A solution is to pair nonbinding commitments with reserve accounts so that integrity of the
credits sold is not jeopardized if the country fails to meet its target emissions in the future.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Permanent Credits
Thegreatestadvantageof permanentcreditsistheirhigherpricecomparedwithtemporarycred-




its could be fully fungible in the carbon market.
However,issuesof liabilityandconstraintsonhostcountrysovereigntymustbeseriouslycon-
sidered. Many potential host countries are opposed to making emissions commitments. Further,
some countries argue that permanent credits will constrain their ability to take advantage of
emerging high-end land uses (Chomitz 1999). However, in a world of national-based REDD poli-
cies, countries would constantly balance land-use policies to achieve target deforestation rates.
Therefore, countries would still have ﬂexibility to respond to changing international markets as
long as they achieved overall deforestation goals.
REDD Credits in a Project-Based World
In a project-based REDD scenario, risks of impermanence are more diﬃcult to manage, causing
sometoquestiontheappropriatenessof permanentcredits(Marland2001;Sedjo2003).Threeac-
counting mechanisms have been proposed to address the impermanent nature of reduced emis-
sions from forestry projects. The tCER approach, or rental credit approach, employs a similar
methodologytotheshort-termcreditapproachforforestrycreditsundertheCDM.Intheton-year
approach,creditwouldbegivenforthenumberof tonsof carbonheldoutof theatmospherefor
agivennumberof years,andanequivalencyfactorwouldbeusedtodeterminetheclimateeﬀect
of this temporary reduction compared with a permanent reduction. The third approach, sug-
gested by the Voluntary Carbon Standard, uses reserve accounts, such as those described in the
previous section.
tCERs, or the Rental Credit Approach
Eventhoughreductionsindeforestationratesmaynotbepermanent,temporaryreductionsmay
still be valuable for all entities involved. Delaying the release of carbon delays radiative forcing
and delays damages associated with climate change (Chomitz 2000; Watson et al. 2000). Tempo-
rary emissions reductions shift down the time path of temperature increases. Thus, every year,
damages would be less than they would have been otherwise. If society has a positive discount
rate, cumulative damages would be less (Chomitz 1999).
Because of a perceived lack of permanence and the potential reversibility of forestry projects
(Neef andHenders2007),CDMcreditsgeneratedbyARactivitiesaretemporary:eithershort-term
5 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriescertiﬁed emissions reductions (tCERs) or long-term certiﬁed emissions reductions (lCERs). Both
tCER and lCER projects must be reveriﬁed every ﬁve years, at which time additional credits may be
generated.
Forestry tCERs are valid for one ﬁve-year interval, after which they expire and new tCER are is-
sued upon reveriﬁcation (Locatelli and Pedroni 2004; Neef and Henders 2007). lCERs are valid for
thedurationof theproject(usually30to60years),atwhichpointtheyexpireandthebuyermust
replace them with permanent credits. lCERs are virtually nonexistent in the CDM market.
In a world of project-based activities, REDD credits could follow the tCER approach employed
in the forestry CDM. REDD tCERs would be valid for one or more commitment periods, after which
theywouldexpireandnewtCERswouldbeissuedif reveriﬁcationshowedthatdeforestationrates
had stayed below the baseline rate. Increases in deforestation rates would be met with decreases
in the number of credits issued. If fewer credits were issued, the buyer would be responsible for
ﬁnding a new source of emissions reductions, which is sometimes called buyer liability.
Marland et al. (2001) and Sedjo and Marland (2003) explain a tCER or rental credit in terms of
acredit-debitsystem.Anemissionscreditisleasedforaﬁnitetimeperiod,attheendof whichthe
renter will incur a debit unless the carbon remains sequestered and the lease is renewed. Marland
et al. (2001) use the analogy of renting a parking space in a garage: at the end of the lease con-
tract, the renter can either renew the lease and continue to park her car there, or she must ﬁnd
anotherarrangementaslongassheisinpossessionof thecar.“Attheendof therentalperiodthe
renterwouldincuranemissionsdebitandthehostwouldbereleasedfromfurtherliability.If the
carbon remained sequestered, the host could: (a) renew the lease at newly re-negotiated terms,
(b)leasethecredittoanotherAnnexBparty,(c)retainthecreditforitsownuse,or(d)setfreethe
sequestered carbon if it had a higher [value] use” (Marland et al. 2001, 265).
Temporary credits represent an attractive approach for investors who have a temporary need
for credits until permanent credit-generating projects come online. It can be ﬁnancially burden-
some for ﬁrms to switch all technologies to low-carbon alternatives before the end of their nat-
ural life-cycle, especially while substitute technologies are still expensive. Temporary credits al-
low old technologies to run their course and do not necessitate premature replacement, thus
creating a bridge to a low-carbon future by buying time for technological advancements and al-
lowing for the gradual adoption of low-carbon technologies.
However,temporarycreditsarenotattractivetoinvestorslookingforpermanentoﬀsets.Fur-
ther, prices for temporary credits would be lower than for permanent credits and thus might not
generate suﬃcient funds to ﬁnance activities to reduce deforestation. In fact, it is possible that
temporary credits would be worth nothing in the current carbon market.
Temporary Credit—Does the tCER Have Enough Value?
The method for calculating the value of a REDD tCER is adapted from the method to calculate AR
CDM credits explained in the Guidebook to Markets and Commercialization of Forestry CDM Projects
(Neef and Henders 2007).
AninvestorwillconsiderbuyingaREDDtCERif thepriceof atCERtodayplusthepresentvalue
price of a permanent credit (CER) upon the expiry of the tCER is equivalent to the cost of buying
a permanent credit today:
Policy Design Issues 5Therefore, if the current and future prices of a CER are known, one can calculate the maxi-
mumpriceof aREDDtCER.Thepriceof atCERisaﬀectedbythediscountrate(d),theexpectedfu-
ture price of a permanent credit (PCERT), and the lifespan of the tCER (T). However, if the price
of a permanent credit rises at the discount rate, a temporary credit would have no value:
Table 3.2 shows how a temporary credit could have zero value using a plausible credit price
scenario. Although the future of U.S. climate policy is unknown, if a cap-and-trade system is put
in place, the price for a carbon credit will equilibrate at some value. We use a permanent credit
price at T=0 of $12. Table 3.2 shows the price at which a buyer would be willing to purchase
tCER’s based on three diﬀerent expected future prices for a permanent credit. If a buyer believes
that the price of a permanent credit will rise at a rate less than the discount rate—perhaps be-
cause of improvements in cost-eﬀective monitoring or decreases in enforcement costs—she will
be willing to buy a tCER. If a buyer believes that the price of a permanent credit will rise at a rate
greater than the discount rate—perhaps because of increased demand due to more aggressive
caps on emissions levels—she will not be willing to buy a tCER. And if the price of a permanent
credit was expected to rise at the discount rate (ﬁve percent in this scenario) a temporary credit
would be worth $0.
Ton-Year Approach
The ton-year approach is based on the premise that one ton of carbon released into the atmos-
phere decays over time until it is absorbed into the ocean or biosphere. The turnover time of car-
bon in the atmosphere essentially becomes the deﬁning factor in determining a “permanent” re-
duction. This is the equivalency factor that relates a ton-year to a permanent reduction. For
example, if a one-ton emissions reduction must persist for 100 years to be permanent, a one-ton
emissions reduction for a one-year duration would be worth 1/100th of a permanent ton.
The ton-year approach raises a number of challenges. First, consensus has not been achieved
regarding the appropriate equivalency factor. Values ranging from 42 to 150 have been suggested
with logical reasoning for each (Marland et al. 2001). Second, ton-years are low-value compared
with permanent tons and take a long time to accrue.
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Permanent credit price at T=0 (PCERo) $12.00
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Price of REDD tCER
Given Different
Future Prices of
Permanent CreditsVCS and Reserve Accounts
To mitigate the risks of nonpermanence for project-based REDD activities and still generate per-
manent credits, the VCS employs reserve accounts, such as those described in the previous sec-
tion. First, a project receives a risk rating based on seven types of risk factors. After determining
the overall risk class of the project, the VCS provides a look-up table that suggests the percentage
of a project’s credits that should be held in a reserve account based on the risk class, shown in
Table 3.3. Credits in the reserve account would be canceled if deforestation increased above the
baseline.
Permanence and Liability Discussion
In a world of national-based REDD policies, impermanence risks are not inherently diﬀerent from
those of fossil fuel emissions reductions. These risks can be managed by balancing the national
portfolio of REDD programs and through reserve accounts. In contrast, project-based REDD poli-
cies carry a greater risk of accidental reversal of carbon beneﬁts than do national-based policies,
andthustemporaryorpartialcreditingmaybeappropriate.Itisdiﬃculttodecoupleissuesof per-
manence from issues of scope, and it may be appropriate to consider the two simultaneously.
Temporarycreditsmayhavezerovalue.Inacap-and-tradesystem,itislikelythatcarbonprices
willriseatthediscountrate,atleastfortheforeseeablefuture.If carbonpricesriseatthediscount
rate, temporary credits will have no present value ($0). Therefore, partial crediting, such as the
ton-year approach and the VCS reserve accounts, might be a more appropriate means to account
for temporary reductions in deforestation emissions than temporary credits.
Eﬀect on the Carbon Market
From some perspectives, REDD-generated credits are envisioned as the low-hanging fruit of the
carbon market, oﬀering large quantities of cheap credits. It is posited that REDD-generated credits
would increase the supply of carbon credits and thus reduce the price of carbon. If realized, this
could reduce the cost of CO2 mitigation. However, it could also reduce incentives to invest in
clean-energy technologies, and thus delay the transformation to a low-carbon economy.
Recent optimization modeling research by Tavoni et al. (2007) shows that forestry credits,
largely from REDD activities, could have a profound eﬀect on the global cost of implementing cli-
matechangepolicy.Withinthecontextof a550ppmvCO2stabilizationtarget,forestsinkscould
contributetoone-thirdof thetotalabatementmeasurestakentoachievethistarget.Theirmodel
predicts that using forest sinks to meet emissions targets would decrease the price of carbon by
40 percent by 2050 and decreases the cumulative global cost of climate change policy by 50 per-
cent, from 0.2 to 0.1 percent of global income (for the year 2070). By lowering the carbon price
and the total cost of implementing target climate change policies, forestry displaces some abate-
ment in the energy sector for the ﬁrst 10–20 years, namely the deployment of low-carbon tech-
nologiesintheenergysectorsuchascarboncaptureandsequestrationandnuclearpower(Tavoni
et al. 2007).
Other studies ﬁnd that forestry credits will have a more moderate eﬀect on carbon prices and
the deployment of low-carbon technology. Cabezas and Keohane (2008) analyzed the potential
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Low 5–10%impacts of REDD credits on the carbon market using a spreadsheet-based tool developed by Envi-
ronmentalDefense.TheyfoundthatallowingREDDcreditstobeusedforcompliancewouldlower
the carbon price by 13 percent, and that a more expansive policy including all forestry activities
could reduce the price by 33 percent. Despite these price impacts, Cabezas and Kepoane found
thatthecarbonpricewouldstillbehighenoughtocreateincentivesforlow-carbontechnologies.
Under the expansive policy scenario, they found that carbon prices would be $16/tCO2 in 2012,
$24/tCO2 in 2020, and $40/tCO2 in 2030. One of the crucial factors in their analysis was the abil-
itytobankemissionsreductions—meaningthe“abilityof regulatedentities,inanygivenyear,to
save surplus allowances and credits for use in future years” (Cabezas and Keohane 2008, 4). Be-
cause they did not set any limits on the number of forest carbon credits allowed in the market,
Cabezas and Keohane may overstate the price impact of REDD credits.
Credits from REDD could play a major role in achieving these emissions goals while keeping
carbon prices relatively low. However, reducing compliance costs may not align with other social
goalsforthedevelopmentof clean-energytechnologies.StudieshaveshownthatREDDcreditsare
likely to displace some investments in low-carbon energy technologies that are more costly and
wouldnotbeincentivizedunlesscarbonpriceswerehigher.Inreality,manycountriesdonotcur-
rently have the capacity to implement REDD activities. For this reason, forestry credits will likely
have a much more moderate impact on carbon prices and abatement costs, at least initially.
It can be argued that emissions targets have three objectives: to reduce GHG emissions, to en-
courageotherpartiestoachieveemissionstargets,andtoincentivizethedevelopmentof low-car-
bon technology. The inclusion of REDD credits into the existing compliance carbon market helps
achieve the ﬁrst goal. REDD policies would shift the emissions abatement cost curve down result-
inginanincreaseintheeﬃcientquantityof emissionsreductions.Inotherwords,includingREDD
creditsinthecarbonmarketchangesthe“optimal”levelof emissionsreductions.Byloweringthe
total cost of achieving emission reductions, it becomes better for society as a whole to set more
aggressive emissions reduction targets. Coupling REDD credits with deeper emissions reduction
commitments by Annex-1 countries would have little impact on the carbon price, and meet all
three objectives of emissions targets.
Another potential means to address negative impacts that forestry credits might have on the
carbonmarketistocreateapriceﬂoorforcarboncredits.Thiswouldensurethatthepriceof car-
bon would not sink below a given threshold, protecting the carbon market and also facilitating
the conservation of more forests than would otherwise be conserved.
In the case of temporary credits, the potential exists for supply-side volatility. If it is uncertain
whether temporary credits will be renewed, whether due to a host country’s decision not to re-
new or the degradation of forest carbon, the sudden evaporation of the temporary credit supply
could create a surge in demand for permanent allowances, causing price volatility. This risk is ex-
acerbated with REDD credits because a small number of suppliers could have signiﬁcant market
power given the distribution of deforestation emissions. It is conceivable that such price volatil-
ity could be tempered with price ceilings or safety valves. Supply-side uncertainty could be ad-
dressed by scheduling renewal negotiations or veriﬁcation measurements before the end of the
current credit term so that buyers would have suﬃcient time to arrange for other allowances be-
fore their temporary credits expired.
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REDD credits will probably decrease the overall cost of achieving emissions targets. Although this
is generally a good thing, it may also result in the delayed development and implementation of
low-carbontechnologiesintheenergysector.Thedisplacementof low-carbontechnologiescould
beamelioratedbytighteremissionstargetsand/orpriceﬂoors.Thepotentialimpactof REDDcred-
its predicted by models will be dampened by delays in host country readiness to implement REDD
projects.
Temporary REDD credits could cause supply-side volatility due to the limited number of sup-
pliers and Annex-1 countries’ liability for permanent emissions. Such potential volatility could be
addressedwithpriceceilings,safetyvalves,andstrategicschedulingof emissionsveriﬁcationsand
expirations.
Comparison of Current Proposals
Countries that are parties to Kyoto, countries that are not parties to Kyoto, and NGOs have all
proposed REDD policies and mechanisms. Below is a discussion of ﬁve proposals that take diﬀer-
ent approaches to baselines, leakage, permanence, fungibility and capacity building. The discus-
sion (summarized in Table 3.4) describes the basics of how REDD would be incorporated into the
regulatory market under each scheme. This discussion is not meant to be an exhaustive exami-
nationof existingproposals,butrathertoillustratediﬀerentapproachestoaddresstheissuesfac-
ing REDD. All of the proposals discussed here are market-based REDD policies and use ex post ver-
iﬁcation of emissions reductions.
Compensated Reduction
The Compensated Reduction proposal was brought forward by Papua New Guinea and Costa
Ricaonbehalf of theCoalitionforRainforestNations16(Santillietal.2005).Underthisapproach,
developing countries that reduce deforestation rates below a baseline rate generate credits that
canbetradedonthecarbonmarket.REDDcreditswouldbefullyfungiblewithothertypesof emis-
sions allowances. Veriﬁcation of emissions reductions would be ex post, and no credits would be
generated if deforestation rates were not reduced below the baseline.
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REDD PoliciesBecause Compensated Reduction is based on national participation and uses national defor-
estation rates to determine the number of credits generated, any within-country leakage is ac-
countedforinthecalculationof credits.Thebaselinecouldbeconstructedbasedonhistoricalde-
forestation rates or on deforestation during a given period. Although initial participation would
be voluntary, countries that generated REDD credits would agree to maintain or further improve
reduced deforestation rates into the future. Thus, credits would be permanent and participating
countries would be bound to maintain deforestation rates. The approach could incorporate re-
serveaccountstoamelioratetheriskthatacountry’sdeforestationratemightincrease;otherwise,
participating countries would have to purchase credits abroad.
Veriﬁcation of deforestation rates would rely on remote sensing augmented by ground-
truthing.Emissionsreductionswouldbecalculatedfromacombinationof forestchangeandbio-
mass change. Using this methodology, carbon loss through forest degradation could also be cal-
culated, though with more diﬃculty and cost.
Analytical support for Compensated Reduction comes from economic analyses published by
Environmental Defense and the Amazon Institute for Environmental Research in Tropical Defor-
estationandClimateChange(2005)(MoutinhoandSchwartzman2005).Theseanalysesindicatethat
in some countries with high rates of deforestation, forest protection could become economically
competitivewithalternativelandusesatrelativelylowcarbonprices(ontheorderof $5/ton).The
analyses look at the breakeven price for carbon and do not consider transaction costs associated
with implementing REDD policies.
Joint Research Centre Proposal
The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) proposal shares the basic elements of
Compensated Reduction with three modiﬁcations. First, the JRC proposal incorporates forest
degradation, measured using satellite-based methodologies, through three categories of forest
change: intact forest to nonintact (i.e., degraded) forest, nonintact forest to nonforest, and intact
foresttononforest.17Thechangesincarbonstocksassociatedwiththeseforestconversionswould
be calculated using ﬁgures for total carbon stocks for diﬀerent types18 of intact forests, which are
available in the literature (Mollicone et al. 2007).
Second, the JRC proposal suggests that participating country baselines be relative to an aver-
age annual global forest conversion rate (in percentages); the intent is to incentivize countries
withhighconversionratestoreducethemandtoincentivizecountrieswithlowconversionrates
to maintain them. A global reference rate would be set at one-half of the global mean defor-
estation rate. Countries with conversion rates above the global reference rate would generate
credits for reductions in conversion rates. Countries with conversion rates below the global ref-
erence rate would also generate credits as long as conversion rates remained below the global
reference rate (see Figure 3.1). Thus this mechanism tries to reward countries that have already
takenstepstoreducedeforestationandtocreateincentivesforforestedcountriestocombatpres-
sures to deforest. The advantages and disadvantages of including countries with low deforesta-




The Nested Approach proposed by Lucio Pedroni of Centro Agron￳mico Tropical de Investi-
gaci￳n y Ense￱anza and Charlotte Streck of Climate Focus (Pedroni and Streck 2007) incorpo-
ratesanationalREDDpolicywithaninitialproject-basedCDM-likemechanism,which,theauthors
argue, would allow countries to build capacity and transition to the national policy. The Nested
Approach was designed to incentivize immediate action while accommodating diﬀerences in
countries’ current capacities to implement REDD activities.





simultaneously build in-country and investor momentum and learning to facilitate the eventual
transition to national-level baselines and accounting.
Once the total project area of a participating country reached a certain level, the country
wouldtransitiontothenationalREDDpolicies.Thenationalphaseof theNestedApproachissim-
ilar to the basic structure of the Compensated Reduction proposal. The national REDD policies
wouldinvolveanationalbaselineandnationaltargetemissionsrate.Creditsgeneratedduringthe
national phase would be permanent and fungible with any other emissions allowance. Countries
couldallocatethecreditstoprivateentitiesandauthorizethemtotradetheissuedcredits.Abuﬀer
in the form of a reserve account of REDD credits would be required to guarantee the permanence
of emissions reductions. If a participating country exceeded its target emissions from deforesta-
tion and degradation after credits were generated, it could do one of the following:
∫ transfer credits from its reserve account;
∫ acquire credits from other countries;
∫ overcomply in a subsequent veriﬁcation period; or
∫ request adjustment of the target level.
TheNestedApproachacknowledgesthatmanyof thecountrieswiththegreatestneedforin-
ternational funding to support REDD activities do not have the capacity to implement these activ-
ities. Due to weak central governments, would-be investors are generally unwilling to link in-
vestment revenues to government performance. Therefore, private entities are more interested
in investing in project-based activities that avoid some of the political and legal risks of a national
program.
Dual Markets Approach
The Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) proposed the Dual Markets Approach, which creates a
separate market for REDD credits outside the existing carbon market. Because of uncertainty in
boththeenvironmentalintegrityof REDDcreditsandtheeﬀectof REDDcreditsontheexistingcar-
bonmarket,theDualMarketsApproachprotectsthecarbonmarketfromanypotentiallyadverse
eﬀects. In this approach, Annex 1 countries could allocate a portion of their overall cap to be met
by REDD credits. REDD credits would not be fungible with other credits or allowances traded on
Policy Design Issues 5the carbon market. In the example used by CCAP, Europe might commit to reducing emissions
by 25 percent below 1990 levels through domestic reductions and the carbon market, and an ad-
ditional 5 percent through the REDD market, for a total emissions reduction of 30 percent. The
Conferenceof Partieswoulddecidethemaximumamountof REDDcreditsthatanAnnex1coun-
try could use to meet its obligations (Ogonowski et al. 2007).
It is expected to be costly for many developing countries to build the capacity to implement
REDD activities. To send a clear signal to developing countries that the demand for REDD credits
justiﬁes the investment in capacity-building activities, Annex 1 countries will specify at the outset
the developing countries from which they will buy REDD credits.
The theory behind the Dual Markets Approach is that market-based mechanisms provide the
large sums of money necessary to support widespread REDD activities but may disrupt the exist-
ingcarbonmarket.TheapproachallowstheREDDmarkettodevelopwithoutthreateningthesta-
bility of the existing carbon market. Eventually, CoP could decide to link the REDD market to the
general carbon market, making REDD credits fully fungible. If an Annex 1 country does not have
enough REDD credits to meet its REDD market commitment (5 percent in the example above), the
country can buy credits on the general carbon market or borrow from future commitment peri-
ods. The major drawback of the Dual Markets Approach is that it would unnecessarily limit the
amount of REDD activities that would be undertaken and thus limit Annex 1 countries’ ﬂexibility
in meeting their emissions obligations.
Terrestrial Carbon Group System
Unlike the preceding four examples, the Terrestrial Carbon Group System is not a speciﬁc mar-
ket-based proposal but is a way of accounting for REDD activities and other terrestrial carbon that
couldbeincorporatedintomarket-basedandnonmarket-basedproposals.Terrestrialcarbonrefers
to all carbon that is stored in the terrestrial system, including but not limited to forests. The Ter-
restrialCarbonGroupSystemfocusesonmaintainingexistingterrestrialcarbonandcreatingnew
terrestrial carbon and includes all terrestrial carbon activities that both sequester carbon and re-
duceemissions.Assuch,itcreatesincentivesforARactivities,REDDactivities,forestconservation,
and other activities in forests and peatlands.
Thesystemisbasedonnationalaccountingof terrestrialcarbon.Itcategorizesacountry’sto-
talterrestrialcarbonaseitherprotectedortradableterrestrialcarbon.Protectedterrestrialcarbon
is “eﬀectively protected from being emitted by law or by being inaccessible because of biophysi-
caloreconomicconstraints”(TerrestrialCarbonGroup2008,9).ItassumesthatinaBAUscenario,
allthetradableterrestrialcarbonwouldbeemittedoveranextendedtimehorizon(e.g.,50years).
Using the total amount of tradable terrestrial carbon and the expected time horizon, an annual
terrestrial carbon budget can be calculated. The accounting system is relatively straightforward:
∫ All the protected terrestrial carbon must be retained.
∫ The annual terrestrial carbon budget can be emitted without penalty. If a country emits less than
its annual terrestrial carbon budget, it can sell the diﬀerence as terrestrial carbon credits.
∫ To manage the risk of nonpermanence, the protected terrestrial carbon must be increased by the
amount of credits sold. For example, a country that sold 50 terrestrial carbon credits in a year
would have to permanently protect 50 additional tons of carbon. Note that the actual terrestrial
carbon used to generate credits does not have to be recategorized as protected terrestrial carbon.
 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesRather, an amount equivalent to the number of credits must be protected, giving a country ﬂex-
ibility in where it allows deforestation and where it protects forests.
∫ If a country’s emissions of terrestrial carbon exceed its budget, the country is in noncompliance.
It can then purchase credits on the carbon market to stay in compliance, draw upon credits in its
reserve account (if it has one), or withdraw from the system and stop generating terrestrial car-
bon credits. If a country withdraws from the system, it must make up the deﬁcit before rejoining
the system and generating carbon credits again.
ı ı ı
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Host Country Issues
M
uch of this report has focused on the many design issues that must be re-
solved before deciding whether and how to incorporate REDD-generated
creditsintomainstreammarket-basedclimatechangepolicies.Itisequally
important to understand the host country issues that must be addressed
to successfully implement REDD activities. In this chapter, I summarize
some important host country issues.
Drivers of Deforestation
ForanyREDD policy tosucceed, thefactorsdrivingdeforestationmust be well understood.These
factorsandtheirinteractionsvaryamongdeforestationcases,makinggeneralizationsdiﬃcult.In
fact, the factors that drive deforestation in some circumstances do not play a role in others. Un-
derstandingthecase-speciﬁcfactorsinﬂuencingdeforestationisasimportantassecuringthenec-
essary funding to implement REDD activities. As previous projects in the forestry sector have
shown, investing in forest conservation projects without understanding the causes of deforesta-
tion can waste resources and fail to slow deforestation rates (Chomitz 2007).
The driving forces behind tropical deforestation have been examined extensively in the litera-
ture.Twocomprehensivereviewsof existingstudiesondriversof deforestationincludetheback-
grounddocumentfortheUNFCCC’sSubsidiaryBodyforScientiﬁcandTechnologicalAdvicework-
shop on the reduction of emissions from deforestation in developing countxries (UNFCCC 2006),
and a thorough meta-analysis by Geist and Lambin (2001) that examines the proximate and un-
derlying causes of tropical deforestation. A review of the major studies reveals that deforestation
is driven by a number of direct and indirect factors that stretch beyond the forestry sector. Only
a few drivers are globally universal. These drivers and other factors interact diﬀerently among re-
gions and even among cases. In many cases factors related to economic development and the ex-
pansion of agriculture interact with other factors to drive deforestation.
In their analysis, Geist and Lambin (2002) oﬀer a helpful chart (reproduced in Figure 4.1) for
understandinghowproximatefactorsandunderlyingdriversinteracttocausedeforestation.Prox-
imate causes are human activities that directly aﬀect the environment at the local level. Underly-
ing drivers are social, economic, political, and/or cultural processes that indirectly cause defor-
estation.“Otherfactors”orpredisposingconditions,suchassoilqualityandtopography,alsoaﬀect
the likelihood of deforestation. The following discussion of the causes of deforestation follows
Geist and Lambin’s (2002) structure.
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Figure 4.1 Causes of Deforestation
Notes: Five broad clusters of underlying driving forces (or fundamental social processes) underpin the proximate causes of
tropical deforestation, which are immediate human actions directly affecting forest cover.
Source: reproduced from Geist and Lambin 2002, 144.Proximate Causes
Proximatecausesarethedirect,immediatecausesof theremovalof forestcoverandareoftenin-
ﬂuenced by a combination of underlying drivers.
Agriculture
In the tropics, fertile land can be scarce, and the forest frontier oﬀers untapped agricultural po-
tential. The forest frontier is populated by poor and displaced people (UNFCCC 2006), and increas-
ing population pressure on the forest frontier—from urban unemployment, for example—in-
creases the pressure for agricultural expansion and deforestation. Agricultural expansion is a
leading cause of tropical deforestation around the world and was a cause in 96 percent of the 152
cases of deforestation examined by Geist and Lambin (2002) (Geist and Lambin 2002; UNFCCC
2006).Agriculturalexpansionincludesestablishingpermanentcrops,cattleranching,shiftingcul-
tivation, and colonization and resettlement on the forest frontiers. Although shifting cultivation
is often identiﬁed as a major cause of deforestation, Tomich et al. (2005) found that permanent
cropping and cattle ranching are equally inﬂuential. Cultivation of subsistence food crops domi-
nates the forest clearing that is done for permanent agriculture (Geist and Lambin 2002).
Wood Extraction
Generally, logging alone does not lead directly to deforestation, yet when in concert with other
factors it can cause forest conversion (UNFCCC 2006). Selective logging of trees with high com-
mercial value contributes to forest degradation. Degraded forests may ultimately become defor-
estedland;additionally,degradedforestsaremoresusceptibletoﬁrethanintactforests.Although
the eﬀect of selective logging is less than that of clear cutting, it nevertheless requires roads and
infrastructure, which are highly associated with deforestation. One-time logging is also used to
clear land for agriculture. In Africa, frontier forests are cleared through harvesting for fuelwood
and poles (Geist and Lambin 2001).
Transport Expansion
Road construction provides access to forests and is linked to deforestation. The absence of roads
is a barrier to entry to forests. Without roads, timber operations, commercial agricultural busi-
nesses, and individual settlers would not be able to access and exploit forest resources beyond the
forest frontier. The construction of roads opens up the forest interiors to exploitative activities.
Other infrastructure, such as dams and market infrastructure, are not closely associated with de-
forestation.
Underlying Drivers
Underlying drivers of deforestation are the broader economic, political, technological, cultural,
and demographic factors and the fundamental social processes that underpin the proximate fac-




expansion of agricultural markets increase deforestation pressure (Geist and Lambin 2001;
Chomitz 2007). Commercialization of timber and other forest products also drives deforestation
(Geist and Lambin 2001; UNFCCC 2006). Increased gross domestic product (GDP) may have a pos-
itive or negative eﬀect on deforestation (Trines et al. 2006; Chomitz 2007). Market structures and
market variables can also have varying eﬀects, depending on how they aﬀect the proﬁtability of
forest uses. Poverty and lack of employment may encourage deforestation via forest clearing for
subsistence agriculture. On the other hand, payments for ecosystem services such as carbon and
biodiversitymayencourageforestconservationif theyoﬀsetthebeneﬁtsof deforestationandare
directed to the appropriate parties.
Policy and Institutional Factors
Policy and institutional factors play a signiﬁcant role in deforestation. In some cases, policies en-
couragedeforestationthroughagriculturalincentives,transportationandinfrastructuredevelop-
ment, urban expansion, and timber subsidies (Geist and Lambin 2001; Trines et al. 2006; UNFCCC
2006;Chomitz2007).Weakgovernanceinstitutionsandcorruptionareassociatedwithillegallog-
ging in parts of Asia and with agricultural expansion in Latin America. Not only do weak institu-
tionsandcorruptionleadtodeforestation,theyalsoimpedethedevelopmentof localcapacityto
implementREDDprojects.Poorlydeﬁnedpropertyrightsandlandtenureissuescanresultinopen-
access forests that are overexploited. However, establishing property rights may further encour-
age deforestation, depending on how property rights are assigned and how resources were his-
torically used by the stakeholders. Chomitz (2007) suggests that land tenure issues be addressed
while a forest is still intact—before it becomes a frontier forest subject to competing interests.
Technological Factors
Technological factors aﬀecting deforestation include technologies to increase agricultural inten-
siﬁcationandinferiortechnologiesintheloggingsectorthatleadtowastefulpractices(Geistand
Lambin 2001). Technologies that increase the proﬁtability of agriculture can promote the expan-
sionof agricultureintoforestedlandthatislesssuitableforagricultureandwouldotherwisehave
resultedinmarginalagriculturalreturns(AngelsonandKaimowitz2001;GeistandLambin2001).
Hypothetically, technologies that encourage the intensiﬁcation of agriculture can decrease de-
forestation pressure by increasing productivity and employment on a given plot (Chomitz 2006).
However,thereislittleevidenceindicatingthatthistrendistakingplace,andif technologiescause
more in-migration to the forest frontier, such technologies may encourage further deforestation
(Tomich et al. 2005).
Cultural Factors
Geist and Lambin (2001) found that cultural factors contribute to the economic and institutional
drivers that underpin deforestation. Cultural factors include attitudes and lack of public concern
for forest conservation, as well as the willingness to continue historical forest practices such as
burning.
Host Country Issues 1Demographic Factors
Natural population growth alone has a minimal impact on deforestation. However, in-migration




whether a section of forest will be selected for deforestation. Areas that are easy to access, have
suitable topography for agriculture, and have high soil quality are more susceptible to deforesta-
tion pressure.
Regional Diﬀerences
Although the causes of deforestation vary around the world, some regional trends result from
similar social, economic, and environmental conditions within a region (UNFCCC 2006). In Africa,
population pressure drives agricultural expansion, which causes deforestation (Kaimowitz et al.
1998).LandrightsarealsoafactorinAfrica,whereuncertainlandtenuredrivesashiftfromcom-
munally owned land to privately held land and results in deforestation caused by shifting agricul-
ture (Geist and Lambin 2002).
In Latin America, land-use policies tend to favor agricultural expansion by medium and large
operations(Kaimowitzetal.1998;GeistandLambin2002;UNFCCC2006).Cattleranchingisamain
factor contributing to deforestation (Kaimowitz et al. 1998; UNFCCC 2006; Chomitz 2007).
In Asia, policies favoring logging and agriculture drive deforestation (Geist and Lambin 2002;
UNFCCC 2006). Logging operations are carried out by larger entities, whereas agricultural expan-
sion is carried out by small farmers (UNFCCC 2006).
Interacting Factors
Deforestation cannot be pinned down to one simple cause; rather, it is caused by a combination
of proximate and underlying factors. The dynamics of these interactions are often location spe-
ciﬁc, and lessons gleaned from one locale do not necessarily translate to others. Although this
makes generalizations about deforestation diﬃcult, Geist and Lambin (2001) identiﬁed some
trends in their analysis of 152 studies of deforestation. They found that deforestation was often
associated with the interaction of three or four underlying drivers relating to two or three proxi-
mate causes:
∫ agriculture–wood–road proximate causes driven by economic, policy, institutional and cultural
underlying drivers;
∫ agriculture–wood proximate causes driven by technological underlying drivers; and
∫ agriculture proximate causes driven by population expansion.
The agriculture–wood interaction was especially prevalent in Asian cases, and the agricul-
ture–road interaction was especially prevalent in Latin American cases.
2 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountriesDespitethosetrends,eachcaseexhibiteduniqueinterlinkages.Further,somefactorswerepre-
sent in multiple cases but interacted diﬀerently according to local circumstances, making it diﬃ-
cult to distill an overarching theory of deforestation. In sum, deforestation results from the com-
plexinteractionof anumberof factors.Theseinteractionsareinﬂuencedbylocalconditionssuch
that drivers of deforestation must be examined on a case-by-case basis to design an appropriate
REDD program.
Funding and Financing REDD Activities
Host countries face two challenges in ﬁnancing REDD activities. First, many countries are neither
ready nor able to implement REDD projects, even if funding were available. Before REDD projects
can be designed and implemented, these countries must develop the capacity to assess forest car-
bonstocks,monitordeforestation,andenforceforestrypolicies.Additionally,becausemarketsfor
REDDcreditsdonotyetexist,hostcountriesandinvestingentitieswilllikelyneedsomeassistance
as they proceed into uncharted territory and inevitably encounter unforeseen challenges.
Second, ex post third-party-veriﬁed credits are preferred in the forestry sector to ensure the
environmental integrity of credits. However, host countries will frequently need up-front capital
investments to implement the REDD projects that will eventually produce credits. At the time for
veriﬁcation, there is the risk that emissions will not have been reduced and credits will not be is-
sued. Therefore, host countries must work with investors to create ﬁnancing mechanisms that
will provide the necessary initial capital and will manage the risk of project default.
A small number of forest carbon funds have recently been developed to address the ﬁrst chal-
lenge and help countries build capacity and implement REDD projects. These funds are described
below. Possible solutions to the second challenge come from the ﬁnancial sector. I also explores
two ﬁnancing mechanisms that have been envisioned for REDD projects.
Forest Carbon Funds
BioCarbon Fund (World Bank)19
The BioCarbon Fund (World Bank 2007a) provides carbon ﬁnance for projects that sequester or
conserve GHGs in forests, agro-ecosystems, and other ecosystems. The BioCarbon Fund tests and
demonstrates how land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities can generate high-
quality emissions reductions with environmental and livelihood beneﬁts that can be measured,
monitored,andcertiﬁedandwillstandthetestof time.Throughitsfocusonbiocarbon,orsinks,
this fund ﬁnances the generation of credits in developing countries that comply with the CDM or
JI, giving these countries access to the carbon market. Because of this objective, the BioCarbon
Fund has focused mainly on AR projects and temporary credits. However, the BioCarbon Fund
has been involved in some REDD projects.
TheBioCarbonFundisadministeredbytheWorldBank.Itiscomposedof twotranches.The
ﬁrst tranche opened in May 2004 and raised $54 million; the second tranche opened in 2007.
Host Country Issues 3Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World Bank)20
The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) (World Bank 2007b) was launched in December
2007 at the Bali CoP. It focuses speciﬁcally on assisting developing countries to reduce emissions
from deforestation and degradation. The FCPF has two separate mechanisms with the objectives
of (a) building capacity for REDD in developing countries, and (b) testing a program of perfor-
mance-based incentive payments in some pilot countries—on a relatively small scale—to set the
stage for a much larger system of incentives and ﬁnancing ﬂows in the future, which would pre-
sumably be funded by the market rather than the facility.
The Readiness Mechanism is expected to be $50 million and will fund capacity building in 20
countries. It will oﬀer these countries technical assistance in developing baseline emissions rates,
estimatingforestcarbonstocks,calculatingopportunitycostsof possibleREDDinterventions,and
designing an adapted REDD strategy that takes into account country priorities and constraints. In
July 2008, FCPF’s steering committee selected 14 developing counties to receive funding through
the readiness mechanism. The countries are in Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon,
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Madagascar), Latin America (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Mexico,
and Panama), and Asia (Nepal, Lao PDR, and Vietnam).
The Carbon Finance Mechanism is expected to be $200 million and will fund the implemen-
tation and evaluation of pilot incentives for REDD. Countries would receive payments for reduc-
ing emissions below a reference scenario, and payments would be made only to countries that
achieve measurable and veriﬁable emissions reductions.
The FCPF aims to create an enabling environment for REDD and amass a body of knowledge
andexperiencesthatcanfacilitatethedevelopmentof amuchlargerglobalprogramof incentives
for REDD over the medium term (5–10 years). If successful, the FCPF will catalyze institutional de-
velopment and capacity building for a global REDD market. It will draw on methodologies from
the BioCarbon Fund.




promoting sustainable forest use, and developing monitoring and forest assessment technology
and methodologies. The fund expects to explore ﬁnancial incentives for REDD through pilot pro-
jects. The GIFC is based in Australia and expects to collaborate with other nations as well as the
World Bank. This $200 million fund was launched on March 29, 2007.
Financing REDD Activities
Forest-secured escrow accounts and the sale of options for REDD credits are two ﬁnancing mech-
anisms that have been proposed for REDD activities. Conceivably, a host of other ﬁnancing mech-
anisms could be designed to provide initial capital and manage the risk for REDD activities.
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The forest-secured escrow account scheme is based on a host country–investor partnership in
which investment is in advance of credit generation, but full payment to the host country is ex
post. Principal investments would go into an escrow account, and interest could be accessed by
thehostcountryasitaccrues,withpayoutof principalandcreditsoccurringattheendof thecon-
tract period (Schwarze and Niles 2000). Alternatively, frequent veriﬁcation could facilitate the in-
crementalissuanceof creditsandpayments(consistingof principalandinterest)forreducedemis-
sions.Althoughtheforest-securedescrowaccountaddressesissuesof permanenceandliability,it
will likely be unattractive to investors because it requires advance payment by investors in ex-
change for delayed returns in the form of credits, the quantity of which is not guaranteed.
Sale of Options for REDD Credits
In this ﬁnancing mechanism, the host country would sell options to REDD-generated credits at a
ﬁxedpricetogenerateup-frontﬁnancingtofundREDDactivities(Schlamadingeretal.2005).Upon
successful completion of the project and veriﬁcation of emissions reductions, investors could
choose to buy the credits at the guaranteed strike price. To maintain environmental integrity, the
sale of options by the host country would be limited to a fraction of the project’s expected emis-
sions reduction (Schlamadinger et al. 2005).
Readiness to Implement REDD Policies
Althoughasigniﬁcantfocusattheinternationallevelisonpolicyandcreditdesign,thesuccessof
REDD ultimately lies in the hands of host countries and their abilities to reduce deforestation.
Therefore,itisimportanttoconsidertheprioritiesandhistoricalforestusesof stakeholdersinthe
targeted forested regions. Further, policies must align with existing governance institutions, and
institutional linkages must ensure that beneﬁts from the generation of carbon credits reach local
communities and stakeholders.
Some of the greatest challenges facing REDD are the varying national circumstances and ca-
pacities of would-be host countries. Many of these countries have been unable to stop deforesta-
tion in the past because of weak institutions and governance mechanisms that are not eﬀective,
transparent, or equitable. Even if suﬃcient funding is made available, these countries will be un-
able to successfully implement REDD activities unless they are able to strengthen forest manage-
ment practices, align other land-use policies (such as agriculture) with forestry policies, and en-
gage local stakeholders in the project design process.
Sustainable development and poverty alleviation are frequently cited as co-beneﬁts of REDD
activities. However, these beneﬁts are unlikely to be realized unless REDD project design speciﬁ-
cally incorporates them as goals and unless local stakeholders are incorporated into the design
and planning processes.
TheFCPFandtheGIFCincludespeciﬁcgoalstobuildcapacityandimprovehostcountryreadiness
for REDD. Additionally, NGOs, such as the Center for International Forestry Research, are engaged
inassessingandstrengtheninginstitutionalreadinessforREDD.Despitethepaucityof pilotprojects,
lessons can be gleaned frompreviouseﬀortsto abate deforestation;many of theseeﬀorts were dri-
ven by other environmental goals, such as biodiversity conservation and watershed maintenance.





This report has explored some of the issues that must be systematically ad-
dressed if an economically and environmentally sound REDD crediting scheme
istobedeveloped.Intheinternationalpolicyanddesignrealm,someof theis-
sues, such as monitoring, have received greater consideration and attracted more consensus than
others. Two issues that call for more attention and analysis are permanence and liability.
Although the integrity of REDD credit schemes depends on their design, the success of REDD
policies ultimately will depend on host countries’ abilities to reduce deforestation. For this rea-
son,itisimperativethatattentionandresearchintohostcountryreadinessparallelseﬀortsonthe
international design issues. Further, communities in forested regions in developing countries are
some of the most important stakeholders because REDD policies will aﬀect their livelihoods, and
thesestakeholderswilllikelybedirectlyinvolvedintheimplementationandmaintenanceof REDD
activities. Without stakeholder buy-in it will be impossible to achieve the environmental and sus-
tainable development goals that are targeted by REDD activities. Therefore, eﬀorts to link on-the-
groundforestcommunitieswithREDDnegotiationsandplanningattheinternationallevelwillim-
prove the chances for success.
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AR aﬀorestation and reforestation
BAU business as usual
CAIT climate analysis indicators tool
CER carbon emissions reduction
lCer long-term carbon emissions reduction
tCER temporary carbon emissions reduction
CoP Conference of the Parties (Kyoto Protocol)
CDM clean development mechanism
CR compensated reductions
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)
FCPF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World Bank)
GHG greenhouse gas
GIFC Global Initiative on Forests and Climate (Australia)
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JI joint implementation
JRC European Commission Joint Research Centre
LUCF land-use change and forestry
LULUCF land use, land-use change and forestry
REDD reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
ha hectare
Mt megatonne
1 GtC 1 gigatonne = 1 Pg (petragramme) = 1000 Mt = 109 tonnes = 1015 grammes
1 tC 3.67 tCO2
$10/tC $2.72/tCO2
Acronyms and Conversions notes
1 CAITistheClimateAnalysisIndicatorsTool,anonlinedatabaseof GHGemissionsdatadevelopedbytheWorld
Resources Institute (WRI). CAIT data come from the UNFCCC, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
(CDIAC), Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Agency (IEA), Earthtrends (WRI), the
U.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(non-CO2andcarbonsequestration),EmissionDatabaseforGlobalAt-
mosphericResearch(EDGAR),SpecialReportonEmissionScenarios(SRES),WorldDevelopmentIndicators(WDI)
online (World Bank), Human Development Indicators online (United Nations Development Programme,
UNDP), GEO Data Portal (United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP), and Central Intelligence Agency
WorldFactbook.Estimatesof CO2emissionsfromland-usechangeandforestryweredevelopedbyHoughton
(Houghton 2003b) and based on the product of change in forest area and change in average forest biomass.
2 The ranking of LUCF CO2 emitters diﬀers signiﬁcantly from a ranking of countries with the highest rates of
deforestation because forest carbon density in forests varies in diﬀerent countries and regions. For example,
burningahectareof forestinSoutheastAsiawillreleasemorecarbonthanburningahectareof forestinAfrica.
3 The data in Figure 2.3 diﬀer from data on GHG emissions published by UNFCCC. Although UNFCCC reports “oﬃ-
cial” emissions, the LUCF data are self-reported by individual countries, frequently contain outdated informa-
tion, do not reﬂect uniform accounting methodologies, and are acknowledged to be imprecise; they serve as
adefaultintheabsenceof morerigorousanalyses.TheCAITdatashowninFigure2.3incorporateHoughton’s
(2003a) “bookkeeping” analyses of LUCF emissions, which he employed systematically for all countries.
Houghton’s(2003a)methodologyincorporatestheself-reporteddeforestationdatawithothermeasurements
of forest change and carbon stock.
4 Although UNFCCC and IPCC use a minimum crown cover of 10 percent to diﬀerentiate between forest and non-
forest,individualcountriescanemployhigherminimumstandards.Manycountriesoptforaminimumcrown
cover standard of 30 percent.
5 Potential host countries were concerned that by undertaking REDD projects, they would commit themselves
tocertainlandusesintoperpetuity,andcountrieswouldlosetherighttomakefutureland-usedecisionsif,for
example, the comparative returns on agriculture and REDD activities were to change in the future.
6 However,therehasbeenasurgeof interestinnonmarket-basedﬁnancing,includingNorway’s$1billioncom-
mitment to the Brazilian Amazon Fund.
7 According to IPCC’s Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, leakage is deﬁned as “the unantic-
ipated decrease or increase in GHG beneﬁts outside of the project’s accounting boundary … as a result of pro-
ject activities” (Watson et al. 2000, 5.3.3). Leakage is discussed further in chapter 3.
8 The potential supply of LUCF credits without preventive crediting is the amount of credits that would be gen-
erated if all deforestation emissions in developing countries were reduced to a target baseline.
9 Transnational leakage or international leakage means that reductions in deforestation in one country cause
deforestation rates in another country to increase.
10 In some cases, subnational yet supraproject baselines might be appropriate, such as a baseline for the state of
Amazonas in Brazil or for diﬀerent islands in Indonesia.
11 Aglobalreferencerateisbasedonaglobalbaseline(theaverageglobalrateof deforestation)butcouldbelower
if it is decided that countries must perform signiﬁcantly better than the global average to generate credits.
 PoliciestoReduceEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradationinDevelopingCountries12 The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Standards evaluate land-based carbon mitigation projects and iden-
tifyhigh-qualityprojectsthatwillgeneratecredibleandrobustcarbonoﬀsetswhilealsoachievingcommunity
and biodiversity goals; www.climate-standards.org/.
13 SocialCarbonisamethodologythatassessthesocial,environmental,andeconomicmeritsof carbonprojects,
developed by the Ecol￳gica Institute in Brazil; www.socialcarbon.com.
14 This would not be the case if, for example, the lowered energy consumption from the compact ﬂuorescent
created market leakage by reducing energy prices so that demand for energy increased, and more energy was
consumed somewhere else. This might arguably happen if, for example, signiﬁcant increases in vehicle fuel
economy lead to dramatically lower oil prices.
15 Note that the forest is growing in relation to the baseline; however, the forest will still be smaller than it was
at the beginning of the REDD activities.
16 Set-asidesaresometimesusedforhigh-riskprojects.Withset-asides,aportionof thecapisearmarkedforspe-
ciﬁc types of reductions or oﬀsets, thus limiting the risk. For example, if a climate change policy deﬁned a 2
percent set-aside for REDD projects, the risk of impermanence would be limited to 2 percent of the total cap.
17 MembercountriesintheCoalitionforRainforestNationsareBolivia,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chile,Congo,
CostaRica,DRCongo,DominicanRepublic,Fiji,Gabon,Guatemala,Nicaragua,Panama,PapuaNewGuinea,
Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. The following countries participate in activities with the Coalition for Rain-
forest Nations but are not members: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Hon-
duras,Indonesia,Kenya,Lesotho,Malaysia,Nigeria,Paraguay,Peru,Samoa,Thailand,Uruguay,andUganda.
18 In intact forests, tree cover can range between 10 and 100 percent but must be undisturbed. There can be no
timberextraction.Innonintactforests,treecovermustbegreaterthan10percent,buttherearesignsof some
timber extraction. Nonforest has less than 10 percent tree cover (Mollicone et al. 2007).
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